An investigation into the design and implementation of an internet-scale network simulator by Richter, John Peter Frank
An Investigation into the Design
and Implementation of an
Internet-Scale Network Simulator
John Peter Frank Richter
December 2008
This work is submitted in fulﬁlment of the requirements for a
Master of Science degree of Rhodes University.
Abstract
Simulation is a complex task with many research applications - chieﬂy as a research tool,
to test and evaluate hypothetical scenarios. Though many simulations execute similar
operations and utilise similar data, there are few simulation frameworks or toolkits
that allow researchers to rapidly develop their concepts. Those that are available to
researchers are limited in scope, or use old technology that is no longer useful to modern
researchers. As a result of this, many researchers build their own simulations without
a framework, wasting time and resources on a system that could already cater for the
majority of their simulation's requirements.
In this work, a system is proposed for the creation of a scalable, dynamic-resolution
network simulation framework that provides scalable scope for researchers, using mod-
ern technologies and languages. This framework should allow researchers to rapidly
develop a broad range of semantically-rich simulations, without the necessity of super-
or grid-computers or clusters. Design and implementation are discussed and alternative
network simulations are compared to the proposed framework. A series of simulations,
focusing on malware, is run on an implementation of this framework, and the results
are compared to expectations for the outcomes of those simulations. In conclusion, a
critical review of the simulator is made, considering any extensions or shortcomings
that need to be addressed.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁeld of network simulation is one of a variety used in networking research. Simu-
lators can be used for prototyping, testing and validating theories as well as recreating
events for further study.
However network simulators used in research require careful development. If re-
searchers construct a network simulator in every area in which they perform research,
much of their eﬀorts will be wasted. However, existing simulators may not always
support the research that could make use of them. Furthermore, simulators which are
incapable of simulations at the scale of the massive world-wide network, the Internet,
are unusable for the broad body of researchers whose research focuses on the Internet
on a regular basis.
The solution to this problem is to develop simulators capable of Internet-scale sim-
ulation, that use a robust set of interchangable modules for simulation that can be
developed rapidly and easily. Through this, modules may be developed to create a rich
library of simulated network components, available to researchers and other users of
the simulator.
This research proposes the development of such a simulator, and suggests a selection
of tests to determine whether the detailed simulator fulﬁls the expectations placed
upon it. Malware has been selected as the core subject of these tests.
The simulator shall be developed, then critically evaluated using the results of the
tests as a basis for determining its eﬀectiveness.
1.1 Introduction of Concepts and Terms
Before discussion of domain speciﬁc research can be undertaken, concepts and terms
that are imperative for understanding must be deﬁned in order to avoid confusion.
Concepts signiﬁcant to this research are deﬁned below - speciﬁcally, simulation, and
the software that executes simulations, simulators, with an emphasis on two speciﬁc
sub-classes of simulators: network simulators and robust simulators, and ﬁnally the
subject of the simulations in this research, malware.
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Simulation
The deﬁnition of simulation, according to the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2008),
is:
The technique of imitating the behaviour of some situation or process
(whether economic, military, mechanical, etc.) by means of a suitably anal-
ogous situation or apparatus, esp. for the purpose of study or personnel
training.
Simulation is the act of preparing for or analysing a scenario by creating virtual equiv-
alents to all the tangible and intangible objects involved in it. The simulation then
follows a series of activities similar to those anticipated. After some period of virtual
time has `elapsed', the system is then reviewed and the changes noted. This allows
researchers to determine likely outcomes to complex scenarios in which many variables
and objects interact with the system.
Simulator
The deﬁnition of a simulator, or simulation framework, from the Oxford English Dic-
tionary Online (2008), is:
An apparatus designed to simulate the behaviour of a more complicated
system; esp. one for training purposes that simulates the response of a
vehicle, craft, or the like, having a similar set of controls and giving the
illusion to the operator of responding like the real thing.
Simulators in the context of computing are programs that can execute simulations on
a computer. They accept a simulation as a series of variables and apply a given set
of alteration rules to it. Once the simulation has been changed by the simulator, the
variables are then reviewed. These variables can then be used to make deductions
about the states of a real system once certain real transitions aﬀect it.
Network Simulators
A network simulator is a speciﬁc implementation of a simulator (deﬁned above), focus-
ing primarily on computer networks. They are used for a wide variety of simulation
models (including malware research, network traﬃc research, and new protocol test-
ing). Because of the broad range of possible simulations, many simulators with a wide
variety of features are available.
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Robust Simulators
In this research, robust simulators are deﬁned as simulators with as few restrictions
as possible placed on simulations. This allows simulation modelers a large amount of
freedom in adding semantic content to their models. The robustness of simulations is
typically in opposition to the eﬃciency of the system (both in terms of memory and
processor costs), as the process of allowing rich semantic content to be added to the
elements of the simulation results in large overhead costs.
Implicit in the concept of a robust simulation is extensibility: robust simulators
allow modelers to extend and alter the components in the simulator in order to better
represent those components as they are in the real world.
The ns-21 and OpNet2 network simulators are both semantically rich simulators, and
Fall and Varadhan (2008) explains that ns-2 is extensible using a combination of the
programming languages C and Tcl to add or change components.
Simulator Scalability
In this research, simulator scalability is deﬁned as the ability of a simulator to simulate
a large quantity of modeled objects (or a very detailed object) within limited execution
time and limited memory constraints. This may include abstraction for eﬃciency and
distribution to increase capacity.
Malware
Malware is deﬁned by the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2008) as,
Programs written with the intent of being disruptive or damaging to (the
user of) a computer or other electronic device; viruses, worms, spyware,
etc., collectively.
Malware is a portmanteau word combining malicious and software. Malware is a
broad term, spanning a range of dangerous software. It typically utilises some form
of communication (be it via manually transferred disks, or over a network) to transfer
software to vulnerable computers. Once this is done, the eﬀects vary depending on the
purpose of the software.
Famous examples of malware include the Morris worm (the ﬁrst Internet worm, a
form of rapidly propagating malware), the Blaster worm, and the I Love You virus.
The testing of the simulator designed and implemented as part of this research was
primarily modeled around the spread of malware, with a focus on Internet Worm re-
search. Much research has been generated concerning malware, speciﬁcally in analysing
1http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/
2http://www.opnet.com/
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the nature of various forms and implementations of malware and attempting to defend
successfully against those forms.
The simulations that model malware that were run can be found in Chapter 6.
1.2 Problem Statement
Simulation is a useful research tool that can help in the development and validation of
models. An important aspect that is lacking in many simulator systems is the necessity
of extension and expansion in the form of robustness or generality, especially at the
Internet scale. This results in the development of once-oﬀ simulations for any research
which takes place that is of an Internet scale, and is outside the scope of existing
components or component semantics.
This can be considered wasteful, as an entire simulator framework must then be de-
veloped to be used for a small subset of simulations, as large, well-developed simulators
are ignored due to a lack of capability.
1.3 Proposal: A Robust Network Simulator
This research proposes a solution to the challenge of large-scale robust and general
simulator development. The development of a simulator solution that can make use
of these traits oﬀers value in its ability to provide this rapid simulation development,
while allowing for a rich existing component set and an easily extensible framework for
further component development. This addresses the problem stated in Section 1.2.
In introducing a complex system such as this, it is essential to initially state and
continually review the work with two major considerations: the value of the system to
the user, and the capabilities expected of such a system.
1.3.1 Value
A robust network simulator system has many uses, depending on the nature of the
user. Particularly in the case of robust simulators, where the simulation domain is
large, the system can be used by a wide variety of computer users for a broad range of
tasks. Users that can expect to ﬁnd the maximum use from such a system are system
or network administrators, software developers that will interact with networking at
some level, and researchers.
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For System Administrators
System or network administrators can use robust network simulators in designing their
networks, testing when they encounter problems, and in preparing for or countering
malicious activity that may inﬂuence their networks. Examples of research that makes
use of simulations for the purpose of protecting or optimising networks include Zou
and Gong (2004) and Baccelli and Hong (2003).
Through the use of a simulator, they may determine the eﬀects of change, model
already-existing changes to see what eﬀect they have, and prepare for scenarios on their
networks that they anticipate occurring.
For Network Software Developers
Software developers that author programs that interact with a network can make use
of a simulator to fully determine the eﬀect their programs will have on a network. By
simulating a network with their software running, they may be able to ﬁnd deadlocks,
traﬃc problems, possible exploits and test problems in their code when networks are
not structured or operating in the way in which they initially anticipated.
In Castaneda et al. (2004) the authors devise a system for countering Internet worms,
and use simulation to determine its eﬀectiveness.
For Researchers
Researchers use many simulators already, such as ns-2 and SSFNet (detailed in Section
2.6) in order to test hypotheses and generate data for conjectures. Robust simulators
allow a single simulation system to be used for a wide variety of simulations that a
researcher might require. By reducing the number of simulator frameworks, researchers
can use a single set of skills, knowledge and code for their work, speeding development
and simplifying their work.
1.3.2 Capabilities and Properties
A complex system such as a simulator can be created in a variety of ways. When
several conﬂicting options in development are being considered, it is important that
clear priorities are established so that the resulting system performs optimally. With
this in mind, the following capabilities and properties are necessary in the system:
Scalable
The simulator must be scalable. Without scalability as a core property of the system,
simulations will be strongly restricted to a ﬁnite quantity of semantic meaning, resolu-
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tion, or addressable simulated objects in the models, or the basic system requirements
will have to be incredibly large. While keeping scalability in mind, it is also important
to consider the trade-oﬀ of optimisation to accuracy. Accuracy is typically lost when
eﬃciency is improved in systems, but in the case of simulators that require highly
accurate results, this should be avoided at all costs.
Scalability can be mitigated by distributing the execution of a simulation, however
the goal of this work is for robust network simulators to operate on single hosts.
Arbitrary Resolution
Because of the varying needs of users (shown in Section 1.3.1), the resolution of a
network simulator needs to be variable. As part of the concept of a robust network
simulator, it is imperative that broad concepts (such as a `worm', or even `the Internet')
can be modeled as an individual entity for users with high-level simulation concepts.
It is also necessary that very low-level concepts (such as individual packets, or even
voltages in cables) be able to be modeled, for the use of researchers and others who
need to explore networking at that level.
Though it is not necessary, it should also be possible within simulations to be able to
change resolutions. For example, a conceptual `network' object in a simulation should
be able to be broken into a variety of `host' objects as necessary. This is a complex
task, and should not be a required aspect of a simulation, but rather an optional feature
should the modeler require it.
Semantically Scalable
Modeled objects within the simulation should be able to contain an arbitrary number
of properties and associated values. It should also be possible for objects of a similar
type to contain diﬀerent amounts of semantic information - some objects in the system
of a certain type should be able to be simply deﬁned, while others should be complex
and have a great deal of associated information.
Distributable
Though it must be able to run simply on a single system, the option of distributing
the execution and memory load must be available. Because of the necessity of scale,
mentioned above, very large networks with large quantities of semantic content are
possible objects of simulations. The memory and processor requirements for such
networks could easily become large enough that single-computer simulation is no longer
feasible. In such a case, the simulator should be designed with distributed or grid
computing in mind, to take advantage of large computing farms or clusters.
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1.4 Goals
In order to guide this research, a number of goals need to be stated and revisited as
development takes place. These will serve to keep the research within useful boundaries,
as well as giving an absolute set of outcomes to be achieved by the end of the research.
These goals are listed here, with justiﬁcation:
1.4.1 Recommendations
A set of recommendations for development of robust simulators (similar in design to
the simulator described in Section 1.3) should be detailed. These should cover the
requirements of such a simulator, as well as displaying research that might aid in
development, and expanding on that with practical development guidelines.
1.4.2 Simulator
As a proof-of-concept, a simulator should be developed using the recommendations
from Section 7.2.1. This simulator must fulﬁll the criteria stipulated in the recom-
mendations, and use the advice the recommendations give. It should be documented,
starting at the development stages and continuing through to its practical uses.
1.5 Research Methodology
In order to properly develop a solution to the problem statement in Section 1.2 and
thus meet the goals in Section 1.4, it is imperative that a proper research methodology
is followed.
A review of research (both current and dated) should take place and will be men-
tioned in Section 1.5.1. Experiments on the proposed simulator should be run to
determine the eﬀectiveness of the simulator for modeling networking and malware, and
is mentioned in Section 1.5.2.
1.5.1 Literature Review
A review of the literature on the subjects that inﬂuence this research must take place.
Speciﬁc areas that will require research include simulation (directly, with research on
simulation itself, and indirectly, with research that makes use of simulation as a research
technique), networking and malware.
This literature review can be seen in Chapter 2.
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1.5.2 Experiments
Simulations should be developed (conceptually initially, then programmatically), then
executed upon the simulator developed as part of Section 7.2.2. The simulations should
thoroughly test the simulator, particularly in terms of robustness (its ability to repre-
sent a broad set of concepts), eﬃciency (its ability to complete simulations in reason-
able periods of time), scalability (its ability to represent very broad concepts accurately
while maintaining eﬃciency) and accuracy (the problem domain simulated should ap-
proximately match observed data).
The experiments used in this research are detailed in Chapters 5 and 6.
1.6 Document Overview
In this chapter, we have reviewed the problems inherent to malware simulation, and a
simulator designed for rapid simulation modeling has been proposed.
In Chapter 2, available textual resources are discussed, focusing on texts that span
the areas of malware, simulation, and networking.
In Chapter 3, design considerations and implementation details for the proposed
simulator are covered.
In Chapter 4, the design of simulations (on a more generic level) are discussed. Pro-
totype simulations that were tested are used to show challenges that were experienced
in the development process, and Internet worms are introduced as the core subject of
simulation.
Chapter 5 introduces simulations, simulating network fundamentals.
Chapter 6 continues simulation, covering Internet worms and more advanced malware
simulations.
Finally, the document is drawn to a close in Chapter 7.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Constructing a simulation framework capable of large simulations and that can serve
a variety of purposes in research is a non-trivial problem - Paxson and Floyd (1997)
entitled their paper Why We Don't Know How to Simulate the Internet, and detail
these challenges.
As the core concept of this work deals with the production of a computer network
simulator, it is imperative that a deep understanding of the workings of the Internet
be available. Section 2.2 considers some literature on computer networking (at a broad
general level) as it pertains to this research, focusing on networking and the Internet
as subjects of simulation.
Section 2.3 continues to consider literature regarding networking simulation, focusing
on present works that use simulation as a research tool. Where simulation has been
used in research, its value is considered and noted for use in development.
In Section 2.4, Internet worms and other forms of network-propagating malware are
discussed. Network security is a common goal of research, and could be used as a focus
for a network simulator.
Section 2.5 considers research on Internet Worm simulation, focusing on simulation
used for understanding the malware and Internet events considered in the previous
section.
Before development can begin, the paradigms, beneﬁts and drawbacks present in
current simulation frameworks need to be extracted and considered. Where aspects
of these simulators allow for broad, eﬃcient simulation, they should be examined and
recorded for later use. This evaluation of existing network simulators takes place in
Section 2.6, concluding the chapter.
2.2 Networking and the Internet
Before any development of network simulators may take place, an understanding of
the fundamentals of computer networking is required. In this section, the fundamental
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notions of modern networking and the Internet are considered. Thereafter, some more
recent research into the way modern networks operate is mentioned and discussed.
2.2.1 History of the Networking and the Internet
According to Leiner et al. (1999), the Internet was ﬁrst mentioned by J. C. R. Licklider
of MIT in Licklider and Clark (1962), and was developed at DARPA and commissioned
by the United States of America's Department of Defense (DoD). Initially termed the
ARPANET, it grew rapidly, with an increasingly large body of researchers working to
improve the communication protocols. In 1972, ARPANET was publically presented at
the International Computer Communication Conference (ICCC), and electronic mail
(E-mail) was introduced.
Between 1973 and 1976, Vint Cerf was contracted by DARPA to develop and ma-
ture the TCP/IP protocols at Stanford. Signiﬁcantly, according to Zakon (2006), the
Department of Defense declared the TCP/IP protocol suite to be their standard pro-
tocols. This resulted in widespread adoption of the protocols, laying the foundations
of the modern Internet.
The Internet grew out of ARPANET, and the modern protocols that are still used
today were introduced - the Internet Protocol (IP), detailed in Information Sciences In-
stitute (1980a), and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), detailed in Information
Sciences Institute (1980b). These take advantage of the layered nature of networking
protocols, deﬁned in International Telecommunication Union (1994).
The Open System Interconnect (OSI) stack is introduced in International Telecom-
munication Union (1994), and introduces the idea of layered networking protocols to
allow for modularity. By keeping the various component parts of networking separated
into layers, it is possible to transparently wrap high level communication in lower level
protocols which hide the speciﬁc communication details. From the opposite perspec-
tive, lower level protocols wrap higher level protocols as data, ignoring the meaning
of the information they contain, acting entirely as the communication medium.
The OSI stack can be visualised as shown in Figure 2.1, presenting the communica-
tion protocols of the Internet as a series of layers. The higher layers are wrapped in
the lower layers which describe the form in which communication takes place.
2.2.2 Networking Research
Due to the large quantities of information that are communicated on the Internet,
contention for bandwidth is a common problem: Jacobson (1995) introduces their
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Figure 2.1: OSI Stack
research by stating: Computer networks have experienced an explosive growth over the
past few years and with that growth have come severe congestion problems. Because of
this, much research has taken place to determine the best or fairest way of distributing
available communication resources: Baccelli and Hong (2003), Dutta et al. (2002) and
Feldmann et al. (1999) are some examples of this.
A common theme in this research is the use of simulation to investigate proposed
solutions to communication diﬃculties. Thus, a common theme in computer network
simulation research is modeling bandwidth, as bandwidth and congestion research will
require this property of networking to be simulated. Discussed below are papers that
discuss networking without the use of simulation, but that include representational
models to emphasise the validity of their research.
Savage et al. (1999) point to the ineﬃciencies of modern IP. Discussing the initial
assumptions made about Internet routing, they show that in many cases more eﬃcient
routes exist between ASs (or Autonomous Systems, a term for a group of networking
resources controlled by a single entity) that could be exploited, but that are not chosen
due to the distance between nodes.
They name four key ineﬃciencies in the present means of routing:
• Poor routing metrics
• Restrictive routing policies
• Manual load balancing
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• Single path routing
They propose an alternative model for routing, which they name Detour, which in-
telligently chooses routes between hosts, suggesting that it would result in signiﬁcant
improvements in performance over the Internet.
The Detour model could be modeled using the proposed simulation, either as a
representational prototype (See Section 2.3.2), or to test its eﬃciency. Any resulting
trade-oﬀs and side-eﬀects, if any, could be observed prior to its deployment, resulting
in a more thoroughly tested model and a greater degree of certainty of its success.
Baccelli and Hong (2003) use a ﬂow abstraction of traﬃc to better model band-
width. They go on to use physics equations from the ﬁeld of ﬂuid dynamics to model
the interactions between TCP and UDP ﬂows, and use the network simulator ns-2
(discussed later in this chapter) to validate their models.
Zhou and Mondragon (2003) deal primarily in statistical modeling of the Internet.
The authors discuss the `Rich Club' phenomenon of the Internet - how nodes in a
network that are already well connected will gain the majority of new connections,
while less popular nodes gain fewer and fewer. After doing this, they discuss other
popular models of the Internet (Inet-3.0 (Winick and Jamin (2002)), Barabasi-Albert
(Barabasi and Albert (1999)), and the Generalized Linear Preference (Bu and Towsley
(2002)) models), and compare it to their own alternative, the Interactive Growth model.
In closing, they state that they "expect the model to be used in simulation-based
research for the Internet traﬃc engineering." In their own research, however, simulation
could be used as a means of both testing and validating their proposed model.
Comparing the statistical modeling of Zhou and Mondragon (2003) to the represen-
tational form of simulation modeling allows a researcher to understand the diﬀerences
and important roles that each type ﬁlls in research - and these two forms of network
simulation are examined in the following section.
2.3 Network and Internet Simulation
There is a broad body of literature in which network simulations have been used to
test hypotheses, such as those mentioned in Section 2.2. In this section, papers that
are relevant to the research presented in this thesis are detailed and commented upon.
In Sharif et al. (2005), it is stated that simulations that take into account packet-level
models of networking and worm propagation more accurately model the complexities
of worms than those that use analytical means to do so. While packet-level models
are more detailed, they require signiﬁcantly larger computational overhead than those
using analytical models. While the paper will be discussed in more detail in Section
2.4, the diﬀerences between analytical (and mathematical) models for simulation, and
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packet-based (or representational) models are underlined in this paper. With this in
mind, the remainder of this section is split into Section 2.3.1 on papers that consider
analytical simulation models and Section 2.3.2 on papers that consider representational
simulation models.
2.3.1 Mathematical Models
Salamatian and Vaton (2001) focus on mathematically modeling the state of a network
using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). HMMs are equations from the ﬁeld of statistics,
which make inferences about unknown states in systems by analysing the outputs of
those systems. This paper uses packet delay and loss to make inferences about the
states of communication channels (in this case, very simpliﬁed states - congested and
non-congested - are used).
This paper presents interesting models of the Internet, and shows a means of pro-
jecting hard-to-acquire knowledge from trivially acquired data. Using information and
models like those used in this paper, it is possible to acquire data about incoming com-
munication and derive models about the most likely states of massive, hard to know
systems (like the Internet).
In Mathematical modeling of the Internet, Kelly (2001) discusses the rate of packet
ﬂow in networks. The author outlines mathematical models and quality of service
systems for the Internet, speciﬁcally focusing on TCP.
The mathematical models shown in this paper could be representationally simulated
by altering the TCP portion of a simulation system and observing the changes in the
overall network that is simulated. By doing this, the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of
the new system can be measured. Once the beneﬁt of this new technology can be
measured, the real value can be used for more accurate decision-making.
Baccelli and Hong (2003), Zou et al. (2002) and many other researchers begin their
research by proposing a mathematical or statistical model for the simulation of com-
puter networks. They then go on to validate their models using a representative network
simulator such as ns-2 or SSFNet.
2.3.2 Representational Models
In Baccelli and Hong (2003), the introduction states that, It is well known that the
packet level simulation of TCP over IP with tools like ns-2 or Opnet is currently not
possible for large populations of ﬂows and/or large numbers of links/routers. This
points to the necessity of dynamic abstraction in the development of a simulator - the
necessity of a simulator to be able to represent various degrees of abstraction, and if
necessary switch between simulating at those diﬀerent levels.
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This paper dealt speciﬁcally with routing, deﬁning traﬃc in terms of ﬂows - an
abstract concept used to describe TCP connections and other form of transactional
communication.
In Bai et al. (1999), the authors use a popular simulator (SSFNet, detailed further
in Section 2.6) to simulate the eﬀect of two protocols on a wireless network. They
proceed to optimise the TCP sliding window for wireless networks by observing the
errors that occur due to the conﬂicts caused by the two protocols (TCP and ARQ, a
radio link-layer protocol). This demonstrates the necessity of components that support
the simulation of wireless networking in a simulator, expanded upon in the proceeding
work.
Chen et al. (2002a) describe a novel idea for distributing routers in an ad-hoc wire-
less network to minimise power use. Their design operates by ensuring that every
contributing ad-hoc host is capable of routing to the Internet, while still using the
minimum number of routing nodes, periodically changing routing nodes to ensure fair
distribution of routing load (with a priority on overall connectivity). They use the
ns-2 simulator to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the system. This demonstrates a
further feature necessary in network simulation - the ability to add (without signiﬁcant
alteration to the simulator) additional `layers', requirements or attributes to parts of
the system - in this case, `physical distance' is an important part of the simulation.
Dyer and Boppana (2001) conﬁrm the necessity of being able to represent `physical
distance' in a simulator that is robust: the authors use the ns-2 simulator to simulate
the performance of TCP, evaluating a variety of routing protocols available for wire-
less or mobile computing. They performed the simulation using a 1000x1000 grid for
location of nodes - indicating that modern research requiring robust network simula-
tors include wireless networking as a part of their simulator's capabilities. This could
be modeled in a simpler manner with a simulator that is capable of containing loca-
tion attributes to their modeled hosts - distance can be calculated easily once physical
coordinates of the nodes are available.
In Cowie et al. (1999), the future plans and open problems that they describe are:
• Visualisation challenges
• Tools for generation and validation of network topologies
• Scalable data collection facilities
• Multiresolution tools for sensitivity analysis
All of these are signiﬁcant problems to be considered when developing simulators. Visu-
alisation can occur either as during- or post-processing, and gives the user an easy and
simple way of determining the state of the simulation. Tools for generating networks
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allow for rapid prototyping and simulation development. Data collection facilities al-
low the system to determine how patterns (such as traﬃc, distribution of node type,
etc.) should be modeled using real data obtained from a network. Multiresolution
simulations are discussed more thoroughly in Huang et al. (1998), and provide a means
of simulating broadly (and eﬃciently) using abstractions while still maintaining a high
degree of accuracy.
Dutta et al. (2002) discuss means of rapidly designing networks using scenario pre-
ﬁltering - a technique that allows for eﬃcient simulations, even though they are com-
plex. This is a technique that could be adapted for use by simulators that intend to
do massive- (e.g. Internet-) scale simulation.
By excluding parts of the network dependant on the amount of bandwidth they are
simulated as transferring, it is possible to limit simulation to only `interesting' parts of
the network, making the simulation process more eﬃcient. This could, however, result
in a loss of accuracy.
Dutta et al. (2002) state:
Packet level simulators, such as ns-2, simulate the network as a series of
discrete events, requiring a number of events proportional to the number
of packets generated by the network. Although simple simulations can
be run quite quickly, simulating scenarios with many nodes and at high
traﬃc rates can easily become quite time consuming. Understanding the
behavior of the network may require many scenarios with alternate traﬃc
or conﬁguration choices. Often many of these scenarios are not interesting,
either they are very overloaded (and so not a sensible operating point), or
they are very underloaded (and so not providing insight into the network's
performance).
This underlines the importance of extracting the signiﬁcant events in a simulation, and
ignoring those that are not important.
Farber et al. (1998) analyse the dial-up traﬃc patterns at the University of Stuttgart,
using data gathered, speciﬁcally focusing on dial-up holding times, login times, traﬃc
load and interarrival times. While the technology used for this paper is dated, the
concepts (statistical modeling, using gathered data for simulation modeling) remain
relevant.
The authors eﬀectively use data gathered to generate a statistical model and evaluate
performance. This is signiﬁcant, because statistical models must play an important role
in simulation development. If an analytical model is presented for testing, a simulator
must be capable of using its available components to best representationally model the
functions presented.
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In Feldmann et al. (1999), models of user and network traﬃc are tested for accu-
racy using the ns-2 simulator. The authors use low-level protocol variables in their
simulation. Simulators should be capable of altering variables at a low level (such as
changing parts of a low-level protocol) easily, and see the eﬀects of the change at higher
level (such as seeing high-level protocols which rely on the aﬀected low-level protocols
changed). This can be seen again in Joo et al. (1999), where common assumptions
of traﬃc patterns used in simulation are challenged. By using two diﬀerent cases of
underlying bandwidth patterns, they show the diﬀering eﬀects that could be observed
in higher-level protocols.
As stated in Section 1.3.1, an important use of simulators is in prototyping and pre-
release testing. In Garetto et al. (2001), a new form of TCP performance measurement
is discussed, and ns-2 is used for simulation to test the quality of the measurement sys-
tem. They base their research on previous work which successfully demonstrated the
positive eﬀects of closed queueing networking for measuring TCP connection perfor-
mance, but which had failed to perform any simulation of this change in measurement.
This indicates the necessity of simulators as tools for prototyping new concepts, as
well as tools for validating existing research which uses analytical models instead of
representational simulation.
In Hanle and Hofmann (1998), three alternative protocols for multicast traﬃc on
the MBONE network are compared, and simulation comparisons are made on ns-2.
The paper comments on the robust set of existing components (particularly protocol
forms) in ns-2, and proceeds to use these components with an added testing layer of
these multicast protocols. Simulators should have prebuilt component sets, while still
allowing users to develop their own components for speciﬁc testing purposes.
Henderson et al. (1998) test and simulate various hypotheses about TCP congestion,
notably imposition of a constant bit-rate policy on a network (and its eﬀects on a long
return-trip time connections). This shows the necessity of packets in a simulation -
while it is obvious that nodes and the connections between them need to be detailed,
this details the necessity of containing TTL (i.e. distance) and time information in
order to adjust the behaviours of nodes for eﬃciency.
In Hofmann et al. (1999), improved means of caching streaming media on the Inter-
net are proposed. Several techniques grouped under an architecture named `SOCCER'
(Self-Organizing Cooperative Caching Architecture) are suggested. They use ns-2 to
prototype this architecture. The suggested techniques and components in the frame-
work are:
• Stream Segmentation (sending part of the stream, not all of it at once)
• Dynamic Caching (if a cache request for an already streaming object is made,
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send with the current connection and send the diﬀerential `patch' afterwards)
• Self Organizing Cooperative Caching (by intelligently and dynamically coupling
caches, they can send objects to various receivers eﬃciently)
These components are all modiﬁcations of the node component, and can be grouped
under the 'sending' and 'receiving' parts of that component. This outlines the necessity
of those components being modular or at least easily editable if the context of the
simulation requires it.
Modeling the topology of the Internet is a fundamental and non-trivial task needed
in an Internet simulator. In Jeremie (2004), methods for modeling the topology of the
Internet are discussed.
Initially, the basics of TCP/IP communications are discussed, with a focus on rout-
ing, inter-host communication and the present organisation of the Internet. This is
followed by a discussion of several existing projects, covering network topology dis-
covery projects and statistical model generators. It then goes on to cover currently
accepted properties of the Internet.
The core of the paper regards the use of CAIDA's Skitter data (Cooperative Associ-
ation for Internet Data Analysis (2008a)), focusing initially on the visualisation of the
data, then moving on to the statistical analysis and discussion of the deﬁnition and
modeling of Internet routes.
In this paper, Paxson and Floyd (1997) discuss the diﬃculties of massive-scale net-
work simulation. The chief diﬃculties that they describe are:
• The heterogeneity of the Internet, speciﬁcally:
 The diﬀerent connection types
 The diﬀerent types of congestion found
 The diﬀerent network topologies and link properties
 The diﬀerent protocols used
 The diﬀerent applications which are run on the various nodes
• The constant change in the nature of the Internet, eﬀectively making it one 'large,
moving target'
• The massive scale of the Internet, where events which are rare at the local level
occur often at some point in the broader network
They then go on to suggest that the best way to cope with these problem is to focus on
the system's invariants: certain facets of the Internet, such as statistical distributions
of connection regularity, packet arrival, and the log-normal distribution of connection
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size and time. They also point out that it is possible to derive some parameters of
the Internet: however, no single simulation can provide them. As Paxson and Floyd
(1997) say: "If you run a single simulation, and produce a single set of numbers (e.g.,
throughput, delay, loss), and think that that single set of numbers shows that your
algorithm is a good one, then you haven't a clue."
Finally, they discuss the Vint project, an attempt at a successful simulation.
Network simulation suﬀers from scaling and granularity concerns: if a network is too
highly detailed, performance impracticalities arise. However, high-level networks fail
to include details that granular simulations can perform. A solution to this problem is
proposed in Rao and Wilsey (2001): multi-resolution network simulations.
Multi-resolution network simulations allow for levels of abstraction and detail to be
introduced into a simulation such that no uniformity in granularity level is required.
This powerful tool allows networks to be simulated with varying amounts of detail, yet
still allows practical communication between these components.
Combining this with Dynamic Component Substitution (DCS), simulations can be
designed that change resolution at run-time or at compile-time - simulations that allow
dynamic abstraction to compensate for load, to allow minute details to be modeled in
certain sections of the simulation and have these aﬀect the broad generalisations that
are running in other areas of the simulation.
2.4 Internet Worms and Malware
In Aggressive Network Self-Defense by Wyler et al. (2005), several authors relate con-
troversial short ﬁctional accounts that argue and explain the ethics behind the concept
of strikeback - using aggressive or passive tactics to compromise the computers of
attackers, forcing them to cease any malicious activity.
One of the forms strikeback takes is a helpful worm - worms which make use of
backdoors left by other worms, to infect the system, delete the malicious worm, then
delete themselves after propogating and closing the backdoor. Helpful worms are a
form of malware countermeasure, and so are also detailed in the next section.
The idea that helpful worms can be used to counter malicious worms could be used
as a good test of a simulation system. Both worms would (initially) create a massive
amount of traﬃc, and the relative success of each would be an interesting means of
measuring the eﬀectiveness of the concept.
A theoretical construct that is similar to these worms is found in the paper A
Predator-Prey Approach to the Network Structure of Cyberspace, by Gorman et al.
(2004).
Zou et al. (2003) proposes a Dynamic Quarantine System that may help to slow
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worm propagation, based on the principle of `guilty until proven innocent'.
The system uses an unnamed anomaly detection system that guesses when network
activity from a host could be construed as being caused by a worm. Even in the case
of possible false positives, the system `quarantines' the packets that have been sent.
They are not received by the hosts that the system is defending - instead the packets
are held temporarily.
At this stage, the authors comment that in a truly secure system, a human supervisor
should inspect the activity in order to determine whether it is truly a worm, or merely
a false positive. The noted problem with this is that many hosts may be behaving in
a `worm-like' manner, and the length of time it would take for a person to inspect the
quarantine may result in loss of connectivity to critical or harmless systems.
Because of this, the ﬁnal system introduced in this paper proposes simply holding
quarantined packets for a period of time, before ﬁnally allowing them into the system.
Because of this, worm propagation is signiﬁcantly slowed, allowing human countermea-
sures to be developed in a reasonable time.
This system would be particularly useful in countering so-called `Warhol' or `Flash'
worms (discussed in Nazario (2003)) that spread at rates faster than any other kind of
worm found so far.
2.4.1 Worm Countermeasures
Zhang et al. (2004) propose a system of quarantines to counter worm propagation.
While they do not dwell on the details of the quarantine, they use the standard
`Susceptible-Infected-Removed' Markov model to show the advantage of a quarantine
system in reducing the speed at which a worm can propagate. This shows an interesting
means of host classiﬁcation when worms are simulated - hosts can easily be classiﬁed
in one of these three categories, and host behaviour can deﬁned in terms of which state
it is currently in.
In Coull and Szymanski (2007), it is recommended that a worm countermeasure
be installed over a large portion of the Internet. It continues to describe how the
countermeasure system would use a reputation system for analysis of worm attackers.
The apparent challenge in the implementation of this is the installation of a malware
countermeasure package on such a massively heterogeneous Internet, controlled by a
diverse range of interests. This would appear to make this recommendation untenable.
Furthermore, its eﬀect would only be signiﬁcant if these portions were towards the core
of the Internet, were speed and bandwidth are priorities - scanning for worm packets,
however eﬃciently done, would cause a noticeable eﬀect on the Internet.
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Figure 2.2: Susceptible-Infected-Removed model
In terms of simulation, this paper suggests a home-grown simulation system. A
generic, robust simulator could not only perform similar simulations, but could easily
be extended for further testing in the domain. Reputation scores are a simple addition
to most simulations, and can be used to represent trusted or untrusted networks.
The use of anti-worms to counteract malevolent worms is a controversial example
of Strike Back (also mentioned in Wyler et al. (2005)). In Castaneda et al. (2004),
the authors state the major concerns, and cite some famous examples of anti-worms
that have been shown to have detrimental side-eﬀects (notably Welchia). They then
go on to simulate the eﬀects of an anti-worm. The simulations they run, however, are
analytical as opposed to representational - they use a series of mathematical models.
Their results show that anti-worms are not, at present, an appropriate solution to
malevolent worms, but are still an intriguing concept.
Using SSFNet, Briesemeister and Porras (2005) propose and simulate a method for
worm detection and countering. They use a broad catching strategy ('group defense
strategy') to ascertain the origin and signature of the worm, then rate-limit to slow
the spread. This could easily be simulated in a robust simulator engine (and has been,
see Section 4.2.4), particularly well if connection objects have been customised to more
accurately simulate rate limiting.
2.5 Internet Worms and Malware Simulation
Internet worms are an ongoing threat to the stability of the Internet - Castaneda et al.
(2004) describe Internet worms as terrorizing the Internet for the last several years.
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As a result, research is taking place to better understand worms, to prepare for them,
and to consider new forms of worms that might threaten the Internet. One of the tools
used in this research is simulation - it allows security developers and researchers to
prototype concepts safely, more accurately predict outcomes when additional eﬀects
are added to a known system, and experiment with dangerous concepts without any
risk.
One project (in development) that is attempting to make use of massive-scale sim-
ulation for network security research is ISEAGE, developed by Iowa State University
Information Assurance Center (2008).
In this section, Internet Worm research that makes use of simulation is discussed,
along with research speciﬁcally aimed at challenges in Internet worm simulation devel-
opment.
Before any speciﬁc real Internet worms are studied, research that focuses on worms
conceptually is shown in Section 2.5.1.
This is followed by an overview of research on the Code Red vII worm, which has
received a lot of attention from researchers, in Section 2.5.2. Section 2.5.3 continues by
summarising the research on worms other than Code Red vII, and Section 2.5.4 consid-
ers the research about worms in general, without any speciﬁc focus on any individual
worm.
Finally, Section 2.5.5 considers worm simulators that are currently in use.
2.5.1 Mathematical Models of Worm Behaviour
Chen et al. (2002b) introduce a mathematical model of worm behaviour: The AAWP
or Analytical Active Worm Propagation model.
In this paper, Chen et al. (2002b) present a model of worms that randomly scan
through IP space, actively searching for hosts to infect. Factoring in `hitlists', or
initial lists that worms are seeded with for hosts that the author particularly wants
infected (whether they have high bandwidth, are known as exploitable, or for some
other reason), this paper presents the probability calculations of host infection by
neighboring nodes.
The authors spend some time comparing the AAWP model to the statistical model
that was ﬁrst used for modeling worm spread, the Epidemiological model (). One of
the diﬀerences that is notable is the importance of discrete time in infections - a worm
does not start spreading until the host is entirely infected - a factor not taken into
account in the Epidemiological model. They then go on to parameterise their model
for simulating the Code Red vII worm.
This model is well suited to simulation - and as commented upon in Section 2.3.1, it
is important that simulators be capable of easily adapting a mathematical or statistical
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model into a representational one.
2.5.2 Code Red vII Worm
Wagner et al. (2003) summarise the authors' experiences simulating the Code Red
Internet Worm. They also open with an excellent argument for the creation of Internet
Worm simulations:
The beneﬁts of predicting worm behaviour are numerous:
• Better understanding of the behaviour of worms observed in the past
• Estimations of a worm's threat potential
• Estimations of the impact of future worms on the Internet
• Basis of the design of detection mechanisms for worm spreading
• Determination of parameters relevant for worm characterisation
They then continue to explain diﬀerent methods for studying worms: mathematical
models, sandbox testing, study of observed data, and simulation.
Following this, they go on to detail the parameters they used for a simulation they
developed. They used two peer-to-peer networks as a measure of distribution of band-
width on the internet - as an example, because 32% of Napster's users connected at 64
kb/s, they assumed that 32% of the Internet did the same.
They then go on to run various simulations, focusing mainly on bandwidth and la-
tency measuring, and show the similarities between these simulations and the observed
results.
Zou et al. (2002) focuse on the Code Red Worm (speciﬁcally, Version 2) that was
inﬂicted upon the Internet in July 2001.
The authors propose that in order to statistically model the spread of the worm, two
factors need to be taken into account: from the pool of susceptible computers (S), with
some infected by the worm (I), computers can be rebooted, eﬀectively moving them
back to the susceptible pool. Infected computers can also be patched or the worm
can be neutralised, removing them from the infected pool or susceptible pool into the
removed pool R.
Through the use of a simple McKendrick model (originally deﬁned in Kermack and
McKendrick (1927)), the authors deﬁne a series of equations that model the growth of
the Code Red Worm, taking into account the slowing of growth as the population of
pool S becomes saturated and moved into pool I. By using negative growth parameters
for susceptible hosts, positive and negative growth parameters dependent (respectively)
on the number of susceptible hosts and the number of removed hosts for the infected
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pool I, and a positive growth parameter for the pool of removed hosts, independent of
the number of hosts in either pool (as a host can be patched without being infected).
Possible extensions to investigate in this project are the separation of growth pa-
rameters for the removed pool - people may be more likely to patch if their hosts are
infected.
When the Code Red vII worm was ﬁrst discovered on the Internet, one noted side-
eﬀect was an increase of BGP routing traﬃc on the Internet. In Liljenstam et al.
(2002), the possible reasons for this are explored.
The simulator they use is at a high level, referring to ASs or Autonomous Systems.
As ASs can scale in size from single computers to large networks, this simulation results
in large quantities of abstraction.
In order to maintain eﬃciency, this simulation simulates a small number of ASs in
detail, and considers the remainder of the Internet to be a single, large AS.
By using the statistical General Epidemic Model, the propagation of the worm is
modeled. Of interest is the simple idea that the rate of spread of infection is propor-
tional to the product of the two population sizes: the susceptible and the infected.
The vulnerability in the IIS webserver that the Code Red vII worm exploited can be
found in Microsoft (2003c), and the worm itself has been analysed by Friedl (2001).
2.5.3 Other Worms
Bailey et al. (2005) dissected the Blaster worm that was found on the Internet in
August 2003. Initially focusing on a broader overview, they continue by discussing the
workings of the worm, and variants of the worm that it uses. Finally, they conclude
by observing the Blaster worm after the initial spread, noting especially how it is still
alive and active on the Internet.
The Blaster worm was also studied in Castaneda et al. (2004), and the oﬃcial anal-
yses of its propogation can be found in Dougherty et al. (2003), Knowles and Perriott
(2003) and of the DCOM RPC exploit that is uses in Microsoft (2003a) and Microsoft
(2003b).
The Welchia worm is also studied in Castaneda et al. (2004), and its propogation
detailed in Perriot (2008).
The Witty worm is studied in Stewart (2004) and Shannon and Moore (2007), and
the vulnerability used is detailed in Gatti et al. (2004).
2.5.4 General Worm Literature
Weaver et al. (2004) focus on the degree of parameter change used in simulations of
worms: most simulations scale down the size of the address space of the Internet in
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order to allow for more eﬃcient simulation. The authors argue that while this remains
relevant, in order to draw useful data from simulations, other parameters need to be
scaled as well. Chieﬂy, their argument focuses on the scan-rate of the worm dropping
oﬀ faster, and the problem of reducing randomness to ﬁt the new scale.
In Zou and Gong (2004), a model for the spread of email worms is suggested. The
authors then go on to mention the simulations that they have run using this model.
Though this paper focuses more ontheory and doesn't dwell on the simulations in-
volved, the important element is the OSI stack layer of the level of simulation: by
creating simulations at the top of the OSI stack, they have abstracted a signiﬁcant
amount of underlying detail.
This highlights a need for robust simulators: high-level protocols must be able to be
simulated in a similar way - should an application-level protocol need simulation, the
framework should be robust enough to support it.
On a more generic level, Gorman et al. (2004) discuss the modeling of malware on
the Internet using methods traditionally associated with biological sciences.
In traditional predator-prey models, it is shown how an equilibrium between two
groups of creatures, a predator species and a prey species, is established. When few
prey animals exist, predators starve and die. When few predators exist, prey animals
grow rapidly. Due to the increasing amount of prey, the numbers of predators swell.
Due to the increasing number of predators, prey population shrinks. This returns us
to the initial state of the example, and shows the established equilibrium.
Gorman et al. (2004) use the metaphors of predator and prey in an online context:
Predators are hackers and malicious software. Prey are internet-enabled hosts that can
be compromised by the predators.
Though signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist between biological predator-prey models and
electronic predator-prey models (such as the speed of growth of the populations, or the
need for certain types of predator to consume speciﬁc types of prey), the model is still
considered viable for simulation.
They then go on to outline a methodology for simulating the predator-prey relation-
ship, with a small percentage of available hosts acting as prey, and predators introduced
into the simulated network system.
2.5.5 Worm Simulators
In Liljenstam et al. (2003), the authors develop and document their worm simulator,
the DIB:S/TRAFEN system, discussing its possible eﬀect on the Internet and the
theory behind its function.
This two-component worm-countermeasure system works by breaking the concept of
a worm into two distinct properties:
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1. The random-scanning nature of (some) worms
2. Packets from a single worm carry some signature speciﬁc to that worm
Through these two properties, the system works as follows: The DIB:S (Dartmouth
ICMP BCC System) system watches certain unassigned IPv4 Internet addresses. Be-
cause the non-existent hosts at those addresses can have no practical functions, any
attempt to access the address can be concluded to be either useless or malicious. Be-
cause of this, any packet arriving at that location is immediately tagged to be watched,
and (because worms can generate massive amounts of traﬃc), the address is ignored
for a small period of time.
If these watched addresses are distributed evenly across a large amount of IPv4
address space, then the packets received can be considered to be a good statistical
sampling of random packets sent across the Internet.
The TRAFEN (TRacking And Fusion ENgine) then observes these alerts, and at-
tempts to ﬁnd common signatures from them. It does this through a series of constantly
updated hypotheses.
Through this combination of systems, large-scale random-scanning events on the
Internet can be rapidly detected and countermeasures can be developed. This could
be simulated using a robust simulator, and would take a form very similar to that used
in network telescopes, considered in Section 2.4.1.
This paper also takes into account the development of a simulator that can be used to
test the DIB:S/TRAFEN system, then discusses experiments done with the simulator.
Finally, the authors compare their simulated data to observed data and conclude
that their system would be eﬀective as a worm deterrent.
2.6 Network Simulators
As discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 2.5, simulation is an important part of network
research, and it has been a vital part of Internet worm research for many years. As
a result, several notable simulators have been developed. These simulators have a
broad application domain - they typically attempt to model (in detail) many forms
of network traﬃc, and allow the user to change parameters according to the needs of
their simulation.
Several simulators are popular amongst researchers, and they are discussed here:
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2.6.1 ns-2
A popular network simulator, ns-21 is a free, open source network simulator that uses
the C and Tcl programming languages to develop simulations. As part of the ns-2 suite,
a variety of tools are made available to simulation developers, such as the simulation
engine (for which the suite is named) and nam, the simulation visualiser.
The following research uses ns-2 as a core component, and displays the simulators
capabilities:
• Chen et al. (2002b) use ns-2 to model a proposed means of wireless ad-hoc routing
choice.
• Dutta et al. (2002) propose pre-ﬁltering as a means of improving the eﬃciency
of simulators, and use ns-2 as an example for testing this.
• Dyer and Boppana (2001) use ns-2 for analysing simulated TCP performance in
a wireless network.
• Feldmann et al. (1999) consider the eﬀects of users and networks on the charac-
teristics of IP traﬃc, and use ns-2 to validate their hypotheses.
• Garetto et al. (2001) use ns-2 in their prototyping of a new form of TCP.
• Hanle and Hofmann (1998) test alternative multicast protocols for the MBONE
network using ns-2 for validation.
• In Hofmann et al. (1999), the authors propose improved means of caching stream-
ing media on the Internet, several techniques grouped under an architecture
named `SOCCER' (Self-Organizing Cooperative Caching Architecture). They
use ns-2 to prototype this architecture.
• Hu and Johnson (2000) discuss on-demand routing protocols - protocols that
only search for the route to a destination node when a sending node sends to the
destination. They discuss and simulate means of caching results of the on-demand
routing information.
• Kanodia et al. (2001) suggest and prototype (using ns-2 simulation) an intelligent
form of QoS module.
• Lan and Heidemann (2003) discuss the system they developed (RAMP, or RApid
Model Parametrization) that listens to real traﬃc, and attempts to parametrise
it in order to create near-real-time simulations. RAMP parameters are designed
1http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/
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to be used with the ns-2 network simulator.
The authors begin by discussing the data sets that they obtained in order to test
their program, then go on to discuss the technologies they harnessed to rapidly
extract parameters from data. They used wavelet-based time series analysis for
scaling, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnoﬀ goodness-of-ﬁt test to determine diﬀerences
in traﬃc datasets. They then go on to compare RAMP to another workload
simulator, SURGE, showing how RAMP, using fewer assumptions about traﬃc
distributions, more accurately models the patterns.
• Kong et al. (2001) use ns-2 as a simulator to conﬁrm their proposed scalable solu-
tion to the security challenge that mobile ad-hoc networks face - the distributing
certiﬁcate authority functions via threshold secret sharing.
• In Marina and Das (2001), the authors make use of ns-2 to perform comparisons
between routing protocols to verify their research.
• Puri et al. (2001) evaluate their protocol for video streaming over the Internet
by making use of the ns-2 simulator.
• Rejaie et al. (1999) develop a congestion control mechanism to encourage TCP-
friendliness, simulating it on ns-2 to determine its various properties in a com-
plicated environment.
• Sahu et al. (2000) use ns-2 to validate their research into diﬀerentiated services.
• Sinha et al. (2001) use the ns-2 simulator in comparing the performance of two
ad hoc routing protocols, DSR and AODV.
• Veres et al. (2000) use ns-2 to simulate the eﬀects of TCP connections on a
variety of network setups, with a particular focus on the changes over a period
of simulated time.
• Xu et al. (2000) make use of ns-2 to present their proposed algorithms for routing
in ad hoc wireless networks where energy is scarce.
Further research which makes use of the ns-2 simulator can be found on their website2.
2.6.2 SSFNet
Another popular simulator in research, SSFNet is a set of libraries used in programmatic
development of simulations. Strong use is made of the `ﬂow' abstraction to more
eﬃciently model TCP connections.
2http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ns-research.html
36
The following research makes use of the SSF framework for developing simulators:
• Cowie et al. (1999) discusses the challenges and considerations which are nec-
essary to adequately model the complete Internet without abstraction (which
causes a loss in accuracy). Related to Cowie and Liu (1999), both describe solu-
tions as they are applied to the SSFNet simulator. A statement made in Cowie
et al. (1999) is another important aspect of network simulation development:
[w]hat works instead is a modeling framework that decouples conﬁgu-
ration data from conﬁguration code. A model is built from a hierarchy of
self-conﬁgurable classes with assistance of a database. The goal at each
design stage is to simplify the class code so that it is both veriﬁably and
intuitively correct. If we can verify the pieces, and verify the methodology
used to glue the pieces together into a large model, then we can inductively
validate even very large, complex models.
Practically, this means that components in a network simulator should be
developed simply, with modularity as a priority. If all simple components in
the system are tested and are operating and interoperating properly, then it
provides additional validation for larger models using similar components.
• Bai et al. (1999) simulate the eﬀect of two protocols on a wireless network, by
observing the corresponding errors that occur.
• Using SSFNet, Briesemeister and Porras (2005) propose and simulate a method
for worm detection and countering. They use a broad catching strategy ('group
defense strategy') to ascertain the origin and signature of the worm, then rate-
limit to slow the spread.
• Li (2001) contrasts the speedup of the SSFNet simulator over that of the ns sim-
ulator, a precursor to the current generation ns-2 simulator described in Section
2.6.1.
• Mao et al. (2002) use the SSFNet simulator to test their hypothesis about the
eﬀects of sender-side loop detection and withdrawal rate-limiting, proposed fea-
tures of BGP.
• Nicol (2001) uses a Dartmouth implementation of the C++ API for SSFNet,
known as DaSSF. The authors use this simulator to test their composite synchro-
nisation algorithm which searches for conditionally optimal channel assignments.
• Perrone and Nicol (2002) discuss the development of an implemention of the Scal-
able Simulation Framework (SSF) for TinyOS - an operating system for smart
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dust. Smart dust refers to the idea of a high number (hundreds to millions)
of tiny processing units that can conceptually work together to do large-scale
computation.
• Xiang and Zhou (2004) describe ways of defending grids of computers against
Distributed Denial-of-Service (or DDoS) attacks, and use the SSFNet simulation
framework for testing.
Other reseach that makes use of this simulator can be found on the SSFNet website3.
2.7 Other Relevant Readings
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (2008a) provides a broad set of in-
formation on packets captured by a network telescope (or darknet), a form of scanning
malware countermeasure. This data is useful as it provides insight into the ambient
noise of traﬃc on the Internet, and is particularly useful for simulation modeling as
it allows for more accurate depictions of traﬃc from an abstracted Internet - allow-
ing simulation development to remain focused without the challenge of modeling and
determining realistic Internet traﬃc.
This data could be used to validate the output of an Internet simulator, but, as ex-
plained in Section 7.4, this was not done for this research due to bandwidth constraints.
The ambient Internet noise theme is continued in Pang et al. (2004), where the
authors study the noise they have acquired through a network telescope and comment
on the results they ﬁnd. This ﬁeld of research is also investigated by Richter and Irwin
(2008), who use a small Internet telescope to make inferences about the composition
of the Internet, considering packets that are received and ﬁnding speciﬁcs about their
origins.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, literature relevant to the development of network simulators was pre-
sented. Section 2.2 focused on networking problems and concepts, speciﬁcally focusing
on the challenge of network structure and design. Section 2.3 considered literature
covering Internet and network simulation, citing documents that had made heavy use
of simulation techniques and noting those aspects that they made use of, in order to
ensure they are included in simulator development.
Section 2.4 began by discussing malware and Internet worms, focusing on Code Red
vII (a particularly well-documented case), extracting information about the worms for
3http://www.ssfnet.org/publications.html
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use in simulation. Section 2.4 then changed the focus to instances where these worms
have been simulated, in order to better see the simulation techniques used in this
problem domain.
Finally, Section 2.6 discussed other popular network simulators, and cited the large
bodies of research that have made use of them.
The concepts taken from this review of current research are used throughout this
work: in the process of the design and construction of the simulation software discussed
in the following chapter, as well as in the development of worm simulations performed
in Chapter 6.
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3 Software Design and
Construction
3.1 Introduction
Constructing robust network simulators is a challenging, complex task that requires
multiple iterations of the implementation and design process. The program evolves as
simulations' needs begin to test the boundaries of the capabilities of the simulator.
Because of the evolution of the simulator, documenting the ﬁnally produced program
is of little use. Instead, the design goals and principles are discussed, and then the
initial program is documented. Once this is complete, the challenges that arose in the
implementation of the simulations are documented, and the improvements that were
made to overcome those challenges are shown.
This chapter discusses the design and construction of a simulation engine, or simula-
tor. Section 3.2 documents the initial design of the simulator, beginning with Section
3.2.1, a discussion of the major conceptual components of the system. Following this,
the planned implementation details of the system are covered in Section 3.3, covering
a more programmatically-oriented overview.
In Section 3.4, the development of simulations is documented, showing the major
forms of simulation components, and discussing how these components interact with
the execution system.
In Section 3.6, the challenges faced after developing and running simulations are
shown, and the improvements made to the system are documented. Note that the
results of the executed simulations can be found in Chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, in Section 3.7, further possible extensions to the simulator are mentioned,
with an explanation for their non-inclusion in the current system.
3.2 Construction of the Network Simulator
The network simulator, which was dubbed GraphSim for Graph Simulator, was
designed with the ability to develop robust, powerful simulations as the chief priority.
Secondary was eﬃciency, as a major priority was keeping the program executing on a
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Figure 3.1: Simulator Subcomponents
single system, and simulated accuracy, as trade-oﬀs for eﬃciency and detail were only
made in extreme circumstances.
Design and development of the simulator was performed iteratively - as simulations
were found to make more demands of the simulator, the system was redesigned and
further developed to extend it's functionality. Because the simulator was created for
users to construct their own simulations and components, it was felt that multiple
design and development phases would be required, as each generation of simulations
would add feature requirements to the simulator engine itself. This resulted in a richer
simulator, with tested component sets.
In designing the simulator, two major points of view were considered: a high-level
overview which described the system in terms of broad concepts, and a programmatic
overview, which took into account the speciﬁcs of the programming that would be done
to implement the system. This was to ensure that the broad concepts that were initially
conceived could be translated easily in the implementation phase of the program, while
losing little of the important functionality that was needed when the system was ﬁrst
considered - the goals of this research should not be compromised due to programming
challenges that arise.
The initial conceptual design is described in Section 3.2.1, while the pragmatic,
programmatic design decisions are detailed in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Initial Conceptual Design
The initial conceptual design of the simulator centered on the vision of a network
of hosts represented by icons, connected with lines, passing packets of information,
represented as icons with data on them, around the network. Hosts should be able to
be added and connected arbitrarily to the network, and through a simple mechanism,
code should be able to be appended to the various components.
Speciﬁc forms of nodes (such as an internet node, a router node or a host that has
been infected with a virus node) could be made, as could speciﬁc forms of connection
(10baseT connection, lossy connection, or `perfect' connection) and packet (UDP
packet, worm-containing packet). These could be modeled within the simulator,
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Figure 3.2: State Component of Simulator
either as subclasses of nodes (if their behaviours are consistently diﬀerent within the
bounds of a simulation) or by adding additional attributes.
This novel system was designed to allow for very rapid conceptual design of networks
and simulations, with simple components that related strongly to their real-world equiv-
alents by allowing attributes of any form to be assigned to them. For instance, a packet
component with these attributes could have a viral payload attribute, set to blaster
worm. With properly speciﬁed attributes in an appropriately designed host (such as
an infectable host, with an act upon payload arrival attribute), this could have se-
mantic ramiﬁcations for the remainder of the simulation (such as causing more infected
packets to be generated from the host).
The simulator was conceptually divided into three subcomponents, as visualised in
Figure 3.1: the state system to hold nodes (considered in Section 3.2.1), a communica-
tion system to model connections (considered in Section 3.2.1) and an execution system
which would act upon the previous two components (considered in Section 3.2.1).
State System
The conceptual design of the state system was a series of nodes with a variety of
attributes and behaviours, as visualised in Figure 3.2. Following the robust theme of
the simulator, they must be capable of simulating the behaviours of a very large range
of devices. Any device that could be connected to any sort of network should be able
to be represented.
Because of this, a very simple and broad set of minimum requirements for node
implementation would have to be deﬁned. Upon reﬂection, the following behaviours
and attributes were considered to be of primary importance, and thus were added to
the template for nodes:
• A unique reference or name
• A behaviour that could, under certain circumstances, allow the node to send
something (presumably a message of some sort) from itself to another node via
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Figure 3.3: Communication Component of Simulator
a connection
• A behaviour that could, under certain circumstances, allow the node to receive
something (presumably a message of some sort) from another node via a connec-
tion
• A list of connections that are connected to this node
• An enlargeable set of secondary, semantic attributes that contained a seman-
tic descriptor (such as IP Address) and its associated piece of information
(192.168.0.1)
With this template in place, programming of the node template could begin. The node
module, described in Section 3.5, was the implementation of this template.
Communication System
The conceptual design of the communication system was a series of connections between
nodes. The isolation of the connection system and the state system was important, as
the connections between nodes can have many more attributes than just the unique
addresses of each node. Concepts such as bandwidth, traﬃc and lossiness must also be
representable in the communication system.
In order to generate a template for a connection, much like that used in the state sys-
tem for nodes, it was necessary to set minimum requirements. The following behaviours
and attributes were considered of primary importance, and used in the connection tem-
plate, visualised in Figure 3.3:
• A reference to the nodes that the connection connects
• A behaviour that takes a message from one node, and delivers it to another node
• A behaviour that can disconnect the connection from the current pair of nodes,
and connect it to another pair
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Figure 3.4: Execution Component of Simulator (Action Subcomponent)
• An enlargeable set of secondary, semantic attributes that contained a semantic
descriptor (such as current lossiness) and its associated piece of information
(21%)
With this template in place, programming of the connection (or conn) template could
begin. The connection module, descibed in Section 3.5, was the implementation of
this template.
Another important conceptual component of the communication system was the
messages that would be passed using the connections. The messages themselves were
rather simple, and comprised of a header (not to be confused with protocol-speciﬁc
headers that would be part of the packets that these messages represent) and a pay-
load. The header contained the unique node names of the sender and recipient of the
packet. The payload contained the information that the message itself would contain
(it would be in this section that a protocol-speciﬁc header would be found were this
concept to be implemented).
In keeping with the robust nature of the simulator, it was also decided that the
enlargeable set of secondary attributes were added to the message system, as various
semantic concepts could be associated with them. Protocol, fragmentation and other
attributes could then easily be associated with the messages in the system.
Execution System
The conceptual design of the execution system is more complex than the state and
communication system. It was designed with three major subcomponents: action
components, the scheduler component, and the main execution loop.
Action components This component was, in fact, deﬁned as a series of mini-components
that could be combined or altered to perform operations upon the state and the
communication systems, visualised in Figure 3.4. Through this manipulation,
the system could be advanced from its initial states.
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Figure 3.5: Execution Component of Simulator (Scheduler Subcomponent)
Figure 3.6: Execution Component of Simulator (Main Execution Loop)
Scheduler component This takes the form of a table (shown in Figure 3.5), com-
bining action components with speciﬁc parameters (such as which part of the
system to operate upon), and an associated simulated time. This table could
be manipulated (by action components) at any point in the simulation, so that
single complex actions (such as send a packet via four hops) could be unpacked
into several simpler actions (such as send a packet from one node to another,
for each hop).
Main execution loop An execution loop contained a timer, which would increment
upon completion of the loop. During the loop, each action component that was
associated with the newly set timer in the scheduler would be implemented, with
the associated parameters set, and the associated code executed. Once complete,
the component would be disposed of. This can be seen as a ﬂowchart, shown in
Figure 3.6, and magniﬁed in Figure 3.7.
The only varying part of this system was the action component, so a template would
have to be generated for it. In order to generate a template for an action, much like that
used in the state system for nodes and the communication system for connections and
messages, it was necessary to ﬁnd minimum requirements. The following behaviours
and attributes were considered of primary importance, and used in the action template:
• A unique name that should be used as an identiﬁer in the scheduler's table.
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Figure 3.7: Main Execution Loop
• A behaviour that will execute a series of commands speciﬁc to the form of action.
• A section of code to be executed when the main execution loop reaches the action
component, which may or may not take parameters.
This template is implemented in Section 3.5.
3.3 Programmatic Design
Having completed the conceptual design, more speciﬁc details of the system needed
to be outlined. Expected core and complex components of the simulator had to be
planned and detailed, in order to avoid problems arising later in the implementation.
These components were considered to be the following:
The container component The container component is largely the parent component
of the rest of the system.
The scheduler component The scheduler component, a sub-component of the en-
gine, is conceptually dealt with in Section 3.2.1.
The execution engine component The execution engine component uses the sched-
uler component to execute actions. It is also a sub-component of the engine
component, conceptually detailed in Section 3.2.1.
The plugin management component This component is the primary component of
interest in this research: the conceptual templates detailed in all of the sections
above are instantiated as modules and used to represent the network that is to
be simulated.
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Container Component
The container is a wrapper component for the entire simulator system. It holds all
of the modeled components of the simulator, and is the part that represents those
objects that the simulations are describing, at any single given moment in time. While
it may be wrapped in a GUI and use external ﬁles for inputs and outputs, for the
purposes of execution, the engine contains all of the components necessary to execute
the simulations.
All of the programmatically detailed components below are sub-components of the
container component. The scheduler and execution engine are part of the main ex-
ecution loop of the program, and operate upon the simulated network, comprised of
modules that have been imported via the plugin management component.
The container component was designed to begin its execution by initialising the
system for simulation. This procedure involves instantiating a setup module that
will create the structure of the network (comprised of nodes and connections, with
the initial messages queued to be sent), and the major actions that are to take place.
It should then add this module as an action component to the scheduler as the ﬁrst
action to take place. Once that is done, the execution engine should then be started.
After this, the main role of the engine is to perform background logging of the state
system, keeping a record of the current state of the system periodically. This serves
two purposes: ﬁrstly, it allows for system restoration at the logged point if the logs
are extensive, and secondly, it allows for analysis of the current state of the system -
initially for debugging purposes, but ﬁnally in order to gather information about the
state of the system at a speciﬁc time.
Scheduler Component
The scheduler component is a sub-component of the engine component. It contains an
ordered table (implemented as a two-dimensional array) with three attributes: a time,
the name of the action component to be executed at that time, and optionally a series of
parameters that are associated with the action at that particular time. An example of
an action that would be without parameters would be a ﬁnish execution and terminate
simulation action, while an example of one which would include parameters would be
a send a message from host X, where X could be speciﬁed as a parameter, as could
the contents of the message if so desired.
The scheduler has to be globally accessible, as other action components are required
to alter it. A common example of this was the sending of a message to a host that
was not immediately connected to the sending host. A simple action that was in the
scheduler, such as send a message from X to Z, where X and Z are separated by host
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Y, could be interpreted and re-added to the scheduler as two actions: send a message
from X to Y to arrive at time 2 at time 1, and send a message from Y to Z to arrive
at time 3 at time 2.
The scheduler itself does not execute these actions. That is the responsibility of the
execution engine. The scheduler is merely a complex means of storing the order of
actions to be executed.
Execution Engine Component
The execution engine component is a sub-component of the engine component. It op-
erates upon the scheduler component, by requesting actions that need to be performed
at speciﬁed times. When the scheduler returns these actions, along with any associated
parameters, the execution engine begins to instantiate these action components and
execute the code associated with them.
The execution engine itself does not contain the code that is executed. The code is
part of the action component that it receives from the scheduler. The action compo-
nents are written as seperate action plugins, which are detailed further below, in 3.5
and in the next described component.
Plugin Management Component
The plugin management component is the ﬁnal sub-component of the engine compo-
nent. In order to properly understand this component, it is ﬁrst necessary to under-
stand GraphSim plugins:
The plugins that are used by GraphSim correspond to the four types of templates
detailed above in Section 3.2.1: node plugins, connection plugins, message, or packet
plugins, and action plugins. Each of these plugins deﬁnes a broad form of the requisite
type. A node plugin, for instance, could be an infectable host plugin, or an IPv4
host plugin.
The plugin manager, then, is the part of the engine that governs the use of the
plugins, containing information about plugins, and allows for their instantiation and
use. As such, it is the most important part of the simulator.
It is broken down further into the following parts:
Plugin Location, Parsing and Import As plugins are stored externally to the simu-
lator, they must be located on the disk, parsed for correctness and imported into
the simulator.
Plugin Instantiation Once plugins have been imported into the simulator, they must
be instantiated on an on-demand basis.
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Through the use of these two parts, the plugin manager can import and instantiate
new plugins as needed.
Robustness in Simulation
Robustness is an important feature in any form of simulation that can easily be adapted
to suit a researcher's needs. It can be deﬁned as the degree of capability a system has
to represent or model reality.
As a result, simulation robustness can be implemented in two ways:
1. Creating no framework at all, as a framework imposes conceptual limitations
2. Creating a very generic framework, using the minimum possible restrictions on
modeling while still imposing order on the system
While the ﬁrst option is tempting, it leads to diﬃculties in development. With no
framework in place, each component needs to be uniquely developed for every sim-
ulation, and the simulator itself will need continual modiﬁcation to support the new
components.
The second option, while not absolutely robust (in that it imposes some order on the
system) can still allow for streamlined development while allowing rich representation
of objects in simulation.
3.4 Construction of Network Simulations
Simulations in GraphSim are constructed in the order and style shown in this section.
They would primarily be composed of instantiated plugins that were introduced in
Section 3.3. Though it is constantly being updated and improved, the simulations
described here will explain the modules and plugins with the underlying assumption
that it is based on the build of the execution engine that was current in late 2007.
The modules that are used for the simulations derive from one of four types: nodes,
connections, packets and actions.
The decision to do this comes from the notion of templatised constructs mentioned
in Section 3.2.1. These templates were used to deﬁne the ﬁnal implementation of the
interface and abstract classes that formed the foundation of the modules.
In order to allow for the broadest range of userbase for simulation development, the
plugins were designed for use with Microsoft's CLR (Common Language Runtime), so
that any language that has been prepared for CLR use (such as Python, C or C++)
can be used for writing simulations. Testing and preparation was done in C# on the
mono platfrom, so the speciﬁc references shown below are tailored with this in mind.
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3.4.1 Planning
Before any simulation is created, careful planning needs to take place. The minimum
information required before programming should begin is as follows:
• What sorts of hosts will there be in the simulation? Should these be placed in
a broad category (using a single plugin) with specialised attributes, or are they
diverse enough to justify several plugins?
• How are the hosts connected, and how would the user wish the connections to
be simulated? Does the user want packets to spend time `on the wire', or would
they prefer immediate packet delivery? Are all hosts mesh-connected, or do they
follow some network structure?
• How complex does the user wish their packet plugins to become? Because several
million packets may be simulated simultaneously, eﬃciency can quickly become
a consideration. Does the user want the `payload' to accurately represent the
contents of a packet, or are they prepared to allow for high-level abstract messages
to be sent?
• Which classes of action occur in the simulation? Does the user need to make an
action plugin for each action in the system, or can they be refactored so that it
uses fewer actions, with parameters passed that aﬀect their behaviour?
Once these questions have been answered, the user should have a clear knowledge of
which plugins should exist in the simulation, and the complexity at which these plugins
will be modeled.
3.5 Modules
Because of the robust nature of the simulation, all plugins contain an enlargeable data
structure, used for adding semantic content to the simulated components as needed.
For ease of use, consider that the structure operates as a dictionary with strings used
as keys and strings used as values, that grows like a vector. The initial design work
termed the keys to the dictionary `tags', so the data structure is termed a `tag list'.
Each of the module types throughout this section have diagrams to explain the struc-
tures that they use. These are included for clarity and explanation of the construction
choices that were made when fundamentally deﬁning the components considered as
building-blocks for a simulator.
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Figure 3.8: Node Module Diagram
Node Modules
Node modules, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, need a unique reference, or name, a
sending behaviour, a receiving behaviour, a list of connections, and a tag list. This
could be modeled using data structures like those shown Figure 3.8.
This header could be used in the interface for node objects. When the interface is
implemented as, say, a `infectable host' node, then it would override the header's basic
attributes and behaviours with it's own.
Connection Modules
Connection modules, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, need a link to the nodes they
connect, a behaviour that corresponds with the sending and receiving behaviours of
the nodes, connecting and disconnecting behaviour, and a tag list. This could be
modeled using data structures like those shown in Figure 3.9.
This header could be used in the interface for connection objects. When the interface
is implemented as, say, a `high traﬃc' connection, then it would override the header's
basic attributes and behaviours with its own.
Packet Modules
Packet modules, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, need information about origin and
destination, a payload, and a tag list. As can be seen, packets are very simple data
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Figure 3.9: Connection Module Diagram
structures that contain no behaviours of their own: they are sent over connections, and
nodes can interpret their payloads on arrival.
This packet interface, then, could be modeled using data structures like those shown
in Figure 3.10.
This header could be used in the interface for packet objects. When the interface is
implemented as, say, a `udp' packet, then it would override the header's basic attributes
and behaviours with its own.
Action Modules
Action modules, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, need a unique reference, or name for the
scheduling table, a behaviour to be executed when their time of execution is reached,
and a tag list. Because the execution behaviour can optionally take parameters, using
C#'s overriding mechanism it is possible to deﬁne more than one function with the
same name, one to be called if the parameter list is included, the other if it is not. This
could be modeled using data structures like those shown in Figure 3.11.
This header could be used in the interface for action objects. When the interface is
implemented as, say, a `node sending' action, then it would override the header's basic
attributes and behaviours with its own.
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Figure 3.10: Packet Module Diagram
3.5.1 Execution Setup
When the engine component is initialised, it goes through a speciﬁc sequence of func-
tion calls. Optimally, every new simulation that is run should require a minimum of
codebase alteration, so it is in the engine that robust initialisation should occur.
In GraphSim, this is done by specifying which simulation should be run through a
`setup' action plugin, which is executed immediately upon simulation startup. Each
simulation has its own setup plugin, and the setup plugin is the only part of the engine
that changes between simulations.
The setup plugin is broken into two sub-functions: setting up the network structure,
and setting up the events that should occur throughout the simulation. Both are
largely dependant on the simulation to be run (for instance, a simple network testing
simulation which has a very simple structure setup, but might have very detailed event
scheduling for micromanagement, while a large-scale full internet simulation might be
quite the opposite). The network structure typically runs through a loop, creating,
naming and adding instantiated nodes to the network structure. The event setup
typically starts with the sending of packets from various hosts.
In most of the more advanced simulations that have been built with GraphSim, nodes
are created with outgoing and incoming packet `queues', so at setup time nodes are
initialised, and packets are then enqueued to various nodes. In the event scheduling
system, a `send packet' action plugin is added to the scheduler with the name of a
speciﬁc node that has enqueued packets passed as a parameter.
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Figure 3.11: Action Module Diagram
3.5.2 Simulation Development
In this section, an example of a simulation that could be set up and executed is de-
scribed.
The ﬁrst components developed in the simulation are typically the start and ﬁnish
action components. The start (or setup) component typically instantiates the node-,
connection-, and several packet-objects, and will (depending on the simulation) also
schedule the actions that are to be performed throughout the simulation.
The ﬁnish action will typically stop any other actions executing, then print a log of
the current state of the system. It will then close the execution engine and stop the
simulator.
Once this has taken place, development will typically start on the nodes and con-
nections that will be used in the simulation - at a design level, the attributes and
behaviours will be considered, then implemented as tags and methods respectively.
If the behaviour of the node will be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of other node
types, then an entirely new class of node will be created to adapt for that. Similarly,
the connection will have variables and methods attached.
Packet objects typically do not require any signiﬁcant changes, as the range of be-
haviours that a packet could represent that would have an impact on a system, is
limited.
Finally, the actions that would take place that would be modeled. The way in which
these are modeled will typically be prototyped and revised several times in the course
of a simulation's development, as action components in particular require iterative
development. Common challenges (raised in Section 3.6.2 below) are easily aggravated
by any bugs in the action component code.
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While action components require a particular attention to detail, the entire simu-
lation development process is iterative - each pass further adding detail or removing
unnecessary elements of the simulation. Once the simulation developer is satisﬁed that
the simulation is complete, then the simulation is done.
3.5.3 Example Simulation Development
The most complex simulation considered in Chapter 5 is a mixture of two types of
nodes, in a mesh-connected network, that connects to a further type of node, and is
capable of routing.
Setup and Finish Components
The setup action will need to create a network of nodes (developed later but noted
during the design stage) which are mesh-connected with connection objects, and which
send a large number of randomly addressed packets (some to the local simulated nodes
and some to randomly generated addresses).
The ﬁnish action will log the number of packets received by each IP address, address-
ing each node in turn (all node types that have been simulated) and requesting the
number of packets they have received and (where applicable) which IP address they
were addressed to. This should then be printed to the screen, allowing the user to see
the outcome of the simulation.
Node Development
The three forms of node that this simulation will require can be referred to as nodes,
routers and network nodes. Each will require a speciﬁc set of attributes to represent
them.
The network node will need to store information on which abstracted nodes have
received packets. Router nodes will require a routing table attribute that stores
information about the types of nodes to which they might route packets.Nodes (as well
as router nodes) will need addressing information so that packets may be routed to
them.
Behaviours will also be diﬀerent - router nodes must route packets when they ar-
rive (unless the packet is addressed to the router node), while normal nodes should
indicate that a packet has arrived in their queue. Network nodes must interpret any
incoming packets and indicate to which abstracted node the packet would be delivered.
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Connection Development
As this is a simple simulation with no special note being taken of bandwidth or traﬃc,
a simple connection can be modeled - the connection will simply dequeue a packet
from the front of a connected node's outgoing queue and enqueue it on the receiving
connected node's incoming queue.
Packet Development
Packet objects also remain largely unchanged from the simple case - addresses of sender,
receiver, and a string for a payload suﬃce for this simulation.
Action Development
Two action types (other than the setup and ﬁnish actions) require development for
this simulation - the sending action (which will execute the send behaviour of the
connection objects where appropriate) and an enqueueing action which will generate
a variety of random packets and place them on nodes' outgoing queues. A side-eﬀect
of the enqueueing action would be to instantiate send actions for each packet which is
enqueued, in order to activate the sending eﬀect.
3.6 Challenges and Evolution
In building a simulator of any signiﬁcant scale, three major challenges arise. The
massive amount of memory required to hold the information pertaining to the state
components becomes untenable on a single computer as the number of nodes and level
of detail rise. This is aggravated by typically poor means of associating semantic
information with nodes. Finally, access speed is an optimisation challenge, due to the
massive number of hosts and the need to rapidly acquire a speciﬁc host upon which to
operate.
3.6.1 Computation Concerns
Li (2001) states that: The major diﬃculty in simulating large networks at the packet
level is the enormous computational power needed to execute all events that packets
undergo the network. The proposed simulator does not consider computational power
a shortcoming: instead of modeling every packet to simulate traﬃc, an attribute can
be attached to a connection component (See Section 3.5).
This also saves memory, a scarce resource which forms the basis of several challenges
mentioned in Section 3.6.2, by removing the necessity of containing every packet in
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memory and using an abstraction of traﬃc instead.
3.6.2 Challenges
Before any attempts at solving problems can be made, it is imperative that the problems
that are being addressed are outlined comprehensively and documented, in order to
ensure that they are given proper attention, are fully understood, and are solved in
isolation, as a novel solution to one problem may not be useful for development of
similar simulators on systems diﬀerent to those used in this work.
Address Space
Memory shortage is a great challenge in a simulation system. If we were to try to
simulate the entire Internet, we would require 232 = 4294967296 hosts to be simulated
(Removing Class D and E networks, it still numbers approximately four billion ad-
dresses). Paxson and Floyd (1997) comment on this in their paper, Why We Don't
Know How to Simulate the Internet.
If we consider the amount of memory required to hold a pointer to a node structure,
we will ﬁnd that the simulation will require 232 × 25 = 237 = 137438953472 or 128
gigabytes of memory. This is not perfectly accurate, as special networks, such as class
D and E networks which will not have to be simulated, have been ignored. However,
these networks are relatively small, and the amount of memory used to represent them
would be insigniﬁcant - the amount of memory needed is still vastly greater than most
modern desktop computers can hold. This does not include information about the
hosts, this is merely the memory used to hold pointers to all of them. This also does
not include the associated communication system which grows exponentially as we add
hosts to the system (assuming the system is mesh connected).
Unnecessary Memory Use
As the simulator becomes more robust, the hosts are expected to hold more and more
information. If we are allowing several diﬀerent concepts to be represented in our nodes,
then they can quite easily hold dozens of variables deﬁning operating system, hardware
speciﬁcations, etc. As shown in Section 3.6.2, the number of hosts in the system might
be large, and the memory structures used to hold them explode the amount of memory
used. The challenge of holding large quantities of information in a very large number
of structures is in optimising the node detail access, and the solution is presented in
Section 3.6.3.
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Node Access Time
Most modern programming languages use a simple data structure such as a `Vector',
or `List'. It would seem tempting to use a structure like this to store the large number
of hosts in our system, as it is a standard in the language, as well as straight-forward.
The challenge arises, however, in the means of access.
An optimisation is possible if we assume that we are simulating a series of nodes
from an IPv4 network. In order to extract a node from the data structure given the
IP address in some form, we need to traverse the structure, comparing every element
with the associated IP address (assuming that the IP address is stored as a detail in
the node).
This is barely noticeable in trivial simulation examples, but when the simulation
grows large, at every time tick the simulator would have to search through several
million elements in the array, thousands of times. The access time for ﬁnding a node
must be incredibly quick in order to facilitate rapid simulation.
3.6.3 Solutions
Having considered the problems of massive address space, unnecessary host memory
use and node access time, it is necessary to document the solutions that were proposed
and show those recommended for simulator development.
Access optimisations
In order to solve the access time challenge presented in Section 3.6.2, it is necessary to
use optimised methods of searching for an object in memory. By using data structures
that are ordered, we can improve search times signiﬁcantly. Presented here are the two
recommended methods: trees and hash tables.
Trees Trees can be used to traverse the IP space very rapidly and eﬃciently. By
separating the hosts by IP address into their hexadecimal pairs, we create a tree
that is four levels deep, and closely approximates network structures. It is also
easier to optimise for space, detailed in Section 3.6.3. Because the time required
to ﬁnd a node is constant (four traversals), eﬃciency in ﬁnding nodes is markedly
improved.
Hash Tables Hash tables can be used for even faster node retrieval. While trees
require four traversals, hash tables can immediately return the node. The only
processing in order to access the node is to apply the hashing function to the IP
address of the host.
In terms of memory, hash tables are slightly superior to trees - trees require
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a logical link to be kept between related elements, while hash tables use keys
(which conceptually are not stored in memory, but which are hashed at runtime)
for memory access.
Space optimisations
A solution to the problem that a shortage of memory presents is to only instantiate
nodes and create pointers to them when they are required. When the simulation
is started, the Internet can be described as a single entity. As a speciﬁc host (say,
146.231.115.89) is addressed, a new node can be dynamically created to represent the
host. At runtime, then, the host can be instantiated and detailed using statistics and
randomly generated values to represent its attributes. A greater challenge exists if
the user wishes to use every host on the Internet (or a particularly large network) for
their simulation. In this case, it is possible to do manual page swapping to a hard-
drive, though access time will be much slower than if the simulation were to be kept in
primary memory. Another alternative is heavy reliance on detail optimisation, detailed
below.
Detail optimisations
The solution to the challenge of host memory use, is to optimise the way in which data
is stored in memory. This can be done in three ways: by altering the way in which
variables are being stored in memory, by using dynamic data structures that only use
memory when required, and by creating reverse detail lists.
Eﬃcient Storage When designing nodes, this factor should be taken into account.
Using large, memory ineﬃcient data structures for these details will result in
a large expenditure of memory. Avoid the use of strings and other list-based
structures if possible, and prefer integers, enumerations and Boolean values. In
places where strings are required, determine if it is possible to use a hash-function
and use a lookup table.
Dynamic Data Structures It is preferable, when creating nodes, to assign no details
to them, and create a dynamic data structure that can hold information that
shows diﬀerences between the node and the norm. In the case of a simulation
where most nodes are heterogeneous, this may present problems. If every node
diﬀers from the norm, or if the number of details that must be represented are
few, then the overhead of a dynamic data structure may overshadow the saved
memory. In this case, it is better to specify details for every node statically.
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Reverse Detail Lists When the number of nodes that have a speciﬁc detail is small,
or, more importantly, if some action needs to performed on all nodes with a
certain property, then reverse lists become a necessity. A reverse detail list stores
a list of all hosts for which a detail is pertinent. An example of its use is in
Internet worm simulation: a list storing all nodes that have been infected by the
worm (and updated every time the worm infects a further host) has signiﬁcant
beneﬁts over storing the details of the infection in the node itself. The ﬁrst of
these beneﬁts is greatly improved eﬃciency. In order to ﬁnd all the nodes in the
system that are infected with a worm, it would be necessary to visit every node
and determine its infection status. With reverse lists, it is a simple matter to
traverse the list and act upon each entry. The exchange for eﬃciency in reverse
detail lists is the extra memory required. The overhead of lists for details may
be greater than the amount of extra memory that would be used to hold those
details, especially if dynamic data structures (mentioned above) are used.
3.6.4 Infection Simulation
One special case of a programmatic/representational challenge that would be encoun-
tered in the development of a network simulator is that of infection simulation. Be-
cause Internet worms can spread so rapidly (the Warhol and Flash worms described in
Nazario (2003) can spread globally in minutes and seconds respectively), the challenge
of representing this in memory arises.
Two options are available for simulation of infection:
Infection lists store the lists of infected hosts on a global level
Host parameters keep the infection information on the speciﬁc simulated node
While the latter option is tempting (as the speciﬁcs for each particular infection can
then be observed, such as duration of infection and number of re-infection attempts),
it introduces a great challenge in the worm propagation mechanism: having to ﬁnd
each node that has been infected then becomes much more diﬃcult. Infection lists are
a simpler solution - a simple loop can run through a list of infected hosts, placing new
infection packets on each hosts' outgoing queue and sending them.
While a hybrid option is also viable (and allows for greater infection details to be
recorded while still allowing for simplicity of execution), it results in large redundancies
in memory, which would be the scarcest resource in the simulation.
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3.7 Further Extensions
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, projects such as GraphSim are continually
evolving to allow for broader simulations to be run. This has been complemented by
the plugin system that allows for incremental improvements to simulations via plugin
evolution, so that the entire system does not need to be changed in order to facilitate
improved simulations.
However the system still has several areas of improvement that could be implemented,
but due to constraints of brevity and scope, they are left as extensions. They are listed
here, and discussed.
3.7.1 Real-Time Visualization Integration
GraphSim was initially conceived as having a rich Graphical User Interface (GUI)
with which the user could interact with the simulated network. This would allow
for a visualisation of simulations initially, and once development matured, eventually
designing of networks at a GUI level.
While it would make an excellent extension to the system, it was considered a sec-
ondary priority. Visualisation of network simulations can be done as post-processing,
and does not need to be a core component of the system - especially if logs of simulated
activities are kept, so that a visualisation tool can show the states of the system.
3.7.2 Real-Time Parameter Alteration
Because GraphSim operates with discrete time and scheduling, it should be possible
to pause execution of the simulation. In this temporarily halted state, parameters in
the system could be adjusted, should they need alteration.
Theoretically, this could be done using plugins and user input, however it was not
considered to be of enough use that it should be included as a core part of the system.
It is assumed that a simulation can be set up in an initial state and thereafter, no
further user interaction will be necessary. All events that occur after the start of the
system can be added at the beginning as scheduled events.
3.8 Summary
The planning and construction phase of simulator development is an important part
of the development process. By considering the development options before writing
the program, it becomes possible to determine where programming challenges and
problems will arise.
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In Section 3.2, simulator development is discussed. First the concepts behind sim-
ulator development are considered, then followed by the concerns that apply to the
programming phase.
Conceptually, the simulator needs several core components: a system to retain the
states of the various simulated elements, a system to allow communication between
these elements, and a means of executing changes upon these elements.
Programmatically, the simulator will also require a variety of systems: an execu-
tion engine that will hold the simulation's information as well as the instructions for
changing them, a means of representing the passing of time in an ordered fashion, a
system for applying changes to components in the engine, and a means of loading and
using an array of modules that each represent some element of the real-world, used in
simulation.
In Section 3.4, the development of simulations is considered. The various types of
modules that will be used for simulation development are considered (nodes, connec-
tions, packets and actions) and detailed.
The anticipated development challenges are then stated, and solutions to these prob-
lems are then proposed.
Finally, possible extensions to the proposed system are mentioned. These extensions
are all possible means of enhancing the system but do not contribute to the core
functioning of the system, but are mentioned for readers who may wish to do further
research in this subject ﬁeld. Appendix C contains a complete list of the plugins
developed during the course of this research.
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4 Simulation Design Decisions
4.1 Introduction
In order to validate the proposed simulator's ability to accurately and easily simulate
real-world scenarios, a series of simulations should be run that can be tested against
observed data. Many problem domains may be simulated, however in order to simplify
these simulations, a single problem-domain was heavily explored - the simulation of
internet worms. The justiﬁcation for this choice of subject can be found in Section
4.2.3.
Section 4.2.1 also describes and deﬁnes many of the subjects of the simulations. It
introduces malware as a core focus of the research, and provides a taxonomy of the
forms of malware used throughout this document. It then goes on to justify the use of
Internet worms as a subject of simulation.
Section 4.2.4 continues the discussion of simulation subjects by introducing malware
countermeasures, such as network telescopes and counter-worms.
In Section 4.3, the initial testing and calibration simulations are discussed. Section
4.3.2, speciﬁcally, deals with the various versions of plugins that were released, covering
the capabilities that were added or removed, and stating the justiﬁcations for these
decisions.
4.2 Simulation Focus: Malware
Malware is a popular source of technology research, due to the importance of infor-
mation security in modern networking and the Internet. Simulation is a tool used in
research for the development and evaluation of scenarios, and as such, plays an im-
portant role in malware research. An example of simulation use for research is the
ISEAGE project, described in Iowa State University Information Assurance Center
(2008). Furthermore, because live malware is dangerous for use in research, simu-
lation plays an even more vital role by allowing security researchers complete safety
while still studying the eﬀects, causes and possible countermeasures to malware.
In this section, malware (particularly the form of malware known as Internet worms)
is deﬁned, evaluated and considered as a subject for simulation in research.
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4.2.1 Malware as an Internet Phenomenon
Malware is deﬁned in the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2008) as Programs writ-
ten with the intent of being disruptive or damaging to (the user of) a computer or
other electronic device; viruses, worms, spyware, etc., collectively.
Malware is a collective term for all software that has been written with malicious
intent. The growth in malware presence on the Internet has resulted in the ﬁeld of
computer security growing tremendously, as personal and organisational protection
against malware becomes a necessity.
4.2.2 Malware Taxonomy
Malware can be grouped into several speciﬁc classes, depending on intent, function and
propogation method. The three main types that are of interest to this work are virii,
worms, and trojan horses.
Virii Virii (singular: virus) are deﬁned in Oxford English Dictionary Online (2008) as
a program or piece of code which when executed causes itself to be copied into
other locations, and which is therefore capable of propagating itself within the
memory of a computer or across a network, usually with deleterious results [...
especially] one capable of being inserted in other programs. This deﬁnition is
broad enough to incorporate worms, mentioned below. If we remove worms from
this deﬁnition, then virii can be said to be non-self-propogating malware, which
spread via human intervention (whether conscious or unconscious), but which
deliver the malicious payload autonomously.
Examples of classic virii include the Stone (See F-Secure Corporation (2008))
and Michelangelo (See Computer Emergency Response Team (1992)) virii.
Worms Worms are deﬁned in the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2008) as, a
program designed to sabotage a computer or computer network [... especially]
a self-duplicating program which can operate without becoming incorporated
into another program. This deﬁnition is limited to malware with autonomous
spreading mechanisms, and autonomous malicious payload delivery, even though
some worms can later change mode in order to allow malicious users into the
system, changing to a Trojan Horse (see below).
Popular examples of worms include the Blaster worm (see Dougherty et al.
(2003)), Welchia worm (see Perriot (2008)), and Code Red worm (see Danyliw
and Householder (2001)).
Trojan Horses Trojan Horses, or simply Trojans, are a class of malware that insinuates
itself into a computer system or network (via human or autonomous means), and
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then proceeds to `open a back door', allowing further illegitimate access to the
system to other entities, be they malware or user. These are considered a diﬀerent
class to those previously mentioned as the malicious payload is not delivered by
the malware itself: it merely allows other, unauthorised users of the system to
perform those malicious acts.
For purposes of this research, speciﬁc attention has been paid to Internet worms.
4.2.3 Rationale for Worm Simulation
Worm simulation was selected for the subject of simulation testing. There are several
reasons for selecting worm simulation as an initial and suitable subject for framework
testing:
Largely Homogenous Activity Internet worms operate by reproducing themselves in
a largely homogenous manner (excluding polymorphous worms, which are outside
of the scope of the testing - Nazario (2003) points out that the Ramen and Nimda
worms displayed multiple attack vectors, the ﬁrst component of polymorphic
worms). Because each similar infection acts in a largely similar way to all other
infections, it means that the range of activities to simulate is kept small, allowing
for simpler simulations.
This will reduce the number of action components (See Section 3.4) that would
need to be developed.
Scaling Activity Density Worms initially begin with very few activities to simulate,
and rapidly scale to massive amounts of simulatable network activity. This al-
lows for a broad range of interesting simulations, scaling from single processor,
nearly immediate simulations, to the possibility of grid-based simulations, run
over hours, days or weeks.
Internet Scale Worms are an Internet-sized event. By simulating Internet worms,
massive simulations become the norm, forcing development to keep eﬃciency
(both in terms of computation and memory) as a high priority.
Well Documented Several famous worms have been dissected, behaviourally and
structurally analysed, and documented extensively. With a large quantity of
available documentation, simulations can remain relevent to the ﬁeld of security
research - Internet worm propagation or scanning algorithms can be accurately
depicted using the scanning algorithms used in the worms themselves.
The worms modeled in this research include:
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• The Witty worm, documented in Stewart (2004) and Shannon and Moore
(2007).
• The Code Red vII worm, documented in Zou et al. (2002), Wagner et al.
(2003) and further in Section 2.5.2.
• The Blaster worm, documented in Bailey et al. (2005) and Castaneda et al.
(2004).
• The Welchia worm, documented in Castaneda et al. (2004) and Perriot
(2008).
Simulations Useful to the Security Research Community By extending the simu-
lations into areas that are currently only being considered or prototyped (such as
Network Telescopes, Moore (2002) Moore et al. (2004) and Inter-Network Con-
tainment, Coull and Szymanski (2007)), the results of simulations can be useful
to the security research community for prototyping, testing, and development.
4.2.4 Worm Detection and Defence Tools
Worm detection and defence are key parts of Internet security. Through early de-
tection systems, complex worms can immediately be addressed and countered, while
simpler worms can be defended against using automated tools, without the need for
(comparatively slow) human intervention.
In this section, three tools are mentioned - network telescopes (a form of detection),
tarpits (a form of defence) and helpful worms (a controversial form of aggressive worm
defence).
Network Telescopes
Network telescopes, sometimes termed darknets, are a form of random scanning worm
defence. Network telescopes work by listening on IP addresses that are not published
(such as in DNS) other than for routing, and which run no valid services, where no
standard traﬃc is expected. By not publishing the IP addresses, one can safely assume
that the incoming traﬃc is not valid network traﬃc - it will either be from misconﬁgured
applications (such as incorrectly entered IP addresses) or from malicious scanning.
By using network telescopes, many large-scale internet threats can be detected at an
early stage of their infection cycle. Using certain worm signature auto-generation tools
(such as Autograph (Kim and Karp (2004)), PAYL (Wang et al. (2006)) or WormShield
(Cai et al. (2007))), network telescopes can have a large impact in stopping the rapid
spread of a worm.
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Tarpits
Tarpits, as described by Williamson and Williamson (2003), Li et al. (2004),Weaver
et al. (2004) and Yegneswaran et al. (2004). are another form of random scanning worm
defence, in some ways similar to network telescopes (see above). LaBrea Tarpits (2008)
is one of the most popular software implementations of this concept. A controller
host on a network listens for ARP requests that go unanswered as no host on the
network is associated with that IP - showing that the requester is either misconﬁgured
or malicious, as above.
The tarpit controller then proceeds to send a SYN/ACK reply on behalf of the non-
existent host, initiating a three-way handshake. Any further contact with the sending
host is ignored, and no socket is opened - the malicious or incorrectly conﬁgured host
will wait for the connection to timeout before continuing with any further connections
on that thread. This timeout results in a large slowdown of major internet threats,
giving more time for further countermeasures to be implemented.
Helpful Worms
A controversial form of strikeback, a helpful worm is a means of countering a malicious
worm.
Malicious worms use security vulnerabilities to infect hosts on the Internet, and will
often leave the vulnerability open for further infections if the host is disinfected but
not immunised. In some cases, malicious worms will close the security hole and open
another, in order to receive commands from a controller of some sort.
Helpful worms use these security vulnerabilities to infect vulnerable hosts, then close
all vulnerabilities, before going through the same malicious worm cycle of infection.
However, once they have propogated for a certain period of time, they delete them-
selves, leaving the host clean and protected from further worm infection.
Though the concept seems sound, in practice helpful worms can often result in equally
massive traﬃc loads as malicious worms, and in some cases can do even more damage.
The classic example of a helpful worm that resulted in rising infection problems is
the Welchia worm, designed to counter the Blaster worm. It has been documented in
Perriot (2008), where it is noted as having a damage level of moderate.
4.3 Early Simulations
The following two sections are a documentation of the process of early simulations that
took place, and, in the case of Section 6.2, a comparison between simulation results
and live data.
67
4.3.1 Initial Simulations and Component Construction
In order to thoroughly test the simulator, simulations of increasing complexity were
run, beginning with very simple connectivity simulations and data transfer. Plugin
development was an iterative process that began with very simple components. A
single set of plugins, `Default Action', `Default Node', etc. was constructed. These
plugins were initially very rigidly deﬁned, with very little variability. After some time,
a hashtable was added, by default, to all major components of the system, allowing
for much more semantic content to be added, for instance, by adding a `bandwidth'
key/value pair to a connection, a single basic plugin could be adapted to represent a
range of connection types, from high-traﬃc, low quality cable to high-quality ISDN.
4.3.2 Component Evolution
Each of the components of the simulation described (nodes, connection, action and
packets) have undergone independent evolution. Nodes and connections, being the
focus of the research performed, received the most attention: actions and packets less
so. The following section documents the evolutionary process that the components
went through.
Node Evolution
As increasing complexity of representation became a pressing need for the simulator,
so the complexity of the node component scaled. The node components were the set
of components which required the most attention, as they represent complex pieces of
machinery.
Initially, all that a node represented was the end of a connection. The sole attribute
of a node was the list of connections which terminated on that node, in order to `fetch'
packets oﬀ the connections.
As more semantic requirements were being made of simulations, so properties were
added to the system.
The ﬁrst major `hard wired' attribute was an IPv4 address, so that nodes could
semantically know their `names', and address packets to other nodes based on a logical
naming scheme.
Once logical connectivity had been achieved, practical operations had to be added
to the nodes. Outgoing and incoming packet queue were added to represent packets
arriving and leaving a network interface (though initially it was only a single property,
and later developed into a full queue), and a set of methods were created for handling
packets on these queues - initially, `interpret packet' and `send packet', while the packet
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queue only held one packet at a time, but later `queue packet' and `accept packet', which
placed packets onto the queues.
After testing, it became evident that two distinct forms of node would be required
in order to simulate as large a portion of the Internet as possible without requiring
an unreasonable amount of resources. This led to a divergance of node types: a Host
node represented a single host in the real world, while a Network node represented a
network of one or more hosts, which interacted on an abstract level. Because of the
abstract nature of a Network node, much internal processing could be reduced to simple
mechanics: every time period in the simulation, the network nodes' internal working
were assumed to operate as if they were a connected series of Host nodes. This also
led to an abstraction which could lead to a more convenient grid processing solution,
by treating all nodes that have been distributed over a grid as a Network node, and
incorporating all their input and output as the Network nodes'.
Connection Evolution
Connection objects were created to represent either logical or physical connections
between hosts, depending on the necessity of the simulation. This deﬁnition, while
very broad, leaves very little implicit actions and properties of a `connection'. As such,
the core deﬁnition of a connection has not evolved past a send action, and two hosts
that the connection links to.
In order to allow for latency and bandwidth, a queue was added to connections.
This was later adjusted to be a vector, as realistic conditions for IP packet arrival
could involve packet arrival in a diﬀerent order to the order in which packets were sent.
Once the base connection object was completed, speciﬁc types of connections were
implemented. Broadly, the two schools of connections were `immediate' and `delayed'.
Immediate connections, though less realistic, used less randomness in their sending
procedure and so were more useful for testing. They also required less computation
and memory, as packets would arrive immediately after sending, be interpreted, and
then disposed of, compared to delayed connections where messages were stored for
some period of time.
Action Evolution
Actions as a base object have remained largely unchanged since the original imple-
mentation. Initially, an action was a standard object (thus containing properties for
name and version, as well as a tag hashtable for customisability), with a single run
method that was executed when the event scheduler reached the action in the execu-
tion sequence. Eventually, this was amended to include a possible override for passing
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a message to the run method, allowing more speciﬁc commands to be executed on a
robust action object.
The primary example of this was in message passing - if an action was created that
passed a message between two nodes, it would (without some means of speciﬁcation) be
tied to only two nodes - a send action would be required for every connection between
one node to another. By adding message-passing functionality, a generic send action
could be created which could then use the message to interpret which node was sending
and which node was receiving.
Packet Evolution
Packets are also largely unchanged from the original design decisions: a packet object
contains a string to identify the receiving and sending node objects, and a string as a
message.
The standard packet object used for simulations run to date is an IPv4 packet type -
the recipient and sending node references are replaced by an IP address datatype, but
no other functionality has been added.
4.4 Distributed Memory Prototype
GraphSim, based on discrete, divisible networks, is an ideal candidate for distribution
over a logical structure such as a computational grid. This would this make the simula-
tor capable of running on systems superior to a desktop or even a single high capacity
server, thereby allowing levels of detail in simulations that could not be practically
implemented on systems without as much power.
However GraphSim was designed with single desktop computer use as a priority.
Making the system grid-distributable is not necessarily contrary to this priority, but it
would require a reconstruction of the underlying memory allocation system on which
the simulator runs.
Throughout the length of this research, memory-use has remained the bottleneck
in simulations. When the number of packets and simulated hosts in a system that
models malware grows exponentially, the memory capacity of computers used rapidly
becomes insuﬃcient. Simulations performed in Chapter 5 became untenable (taking
over 18 hours per simulated tick) once more than one million packets were being simu-
lated. While many computers were available for this purpose, few had more than four
gigabytes of memory. While more than adequate for most simulations, Internet worm
modeling (discussed more in Chapter 4) requires very large quantities of memory, as
worm scanning will refer to (and thus instantiate or at least require record for) many
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nodes and grows exponentially with the worm infection rate. Section 3.6.2 consid-
ers the challenge of memory shortage and points out that a full IPv4-space simulator
would require at least 128 gigabytes of memory. Assuming that computers available
for simulation had 2 gigabytes of memory, this would mean that 64 computers would
be required.
As a result, it was determined that grid distribution of memory was an important
concept for prototyping.
The original grid prototyping ran the entire simulator on every grid node that was
to be used. Lock-step processing (which would have slowed the simulation down due to
network input/output latency overhead) was avoided by executing a diﬀerent simula-
tion on the slave grid-computers (while a controller distributed simulation actions to
perform), which run an inﬁnite loop and instantiated nodes in memory when network
packets arrived specifying the address of the node. Furthermore, the representational
challenge of this prototype added an additional layer of complexity. By distributing
each simulator to a separate computer and allowing asynchronous simulation, the in-
consistency due to minor heterogeneity of simulators became a concern. Because the
simulators were operating on slightly diﬀerent systems (even if the hardware and soft-
ware were originally in a consistent state, networking and other physical aspects of
the systems would result in a non-uniform execution of the simulation), the results
would diﬀer from those which would be generated from a single large system, unless
the simulators would operate in lock-step. .
Because processing was not the bottleneck (commented on in Section 3.6.1), latency
was not considered to be a problem. Instead, the memory overhead of maintaining
multiple running execution engines became the primary concern.
The ﬁnal grid-prototype that was used acted as a node server, which operated as
an entirely seperate program. The entirety of its function was to store address and
node information and return it, and no simulation was performed at any stage. By
distributing the storage of nodes and packets addressed to those nodes to the node
servers, the core simulator could be used for execution while holding only those nodes
which were to be simulated in detail. By using a modiﬁed network node (discussed as
an evolved form of node in Section 4.3.2), which accepted packets to a network node
and then sent them as data to the storage nodes, it was possible to use an arbitrary
number of node servers. Intuitively, it was easiest to divide address space into equal
sizes, so the preferred number of node servers would be a power of two. The prototype
model used two node servers during development, and tested the extensibility using
four servers.
Figure 4.1 explains this concept: the original memory model used a single com-
puter's memory for storing node components. By distributing the memory use, multi-
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Figure 4.1: Distributed Memory Allocation System
ple computers can share their memory for node storage. The right half of the diagram
demonstrates that certain boundaries exist which determine which computer receives
speciﬁcally addressed nodes - in this case, the left node server receives nodes with
addresses lower than 192.168.0.4, while the right server receives those of that value or
above.
Figure 4.1 also demonstrates the abstraction in the memory access - from the pro-
grammatic perspective of the simulation, it has stored the node in local memory. By
abstracting memory access via nodes that represent entire networks, simulations can
transparently access more memory than their local systems have available using a
distributed system.
It was found to successfully improve the memory allocation signiﬁcantly, but as a
non-core component of this research, was not investigated any further.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, the conceptual design of a robust network simulator has been drawn.
The choice of malware as the subject of research was covered in Section 4.2, with
complementary discussion of countermeasure development in Section 4.2.4, focusing
on a variety of methods available for research.
Once Internet worms were established as the focus of the research, the design of the
simulator itself began in Section 6.5. Having constructed the prototype stages of the
simulator, the evolution of the various modular plugins that were used was documented,
with notably more emphasis on nodes and connections than on packets and actions.
This work is evaluated in Chapters 5 and 6 which show the functional aspects of the
simulator, and its applicability to solving real-world large scale issues respectively.
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5 Testing, Calibration and Network
Simulations
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will document the planning, development and results of the earlier simu-
lations that are used by the developed simulator.
Section 5.2 provides a broad overview of the speciﬁcs used in networking for this sim-
ulation. Section 5.2.1 deals with the speciﬁc challenges of IP addressing, while Sections
5.2.2 discusses the parameters of speciﬁc elements of the simulations. The remaining
documented parameters give speciﬁcations for the engine to repeat the simulations
described later in the chapter.
Section 5.3 explains the format that this research uses for documenting simulations,
and Section 5.4 documents the simulations themselves.
Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the chapter with an overview of the executed simula-
tions.
5.2 Network Parameters
If simulations for research are to be run on the simulator framework, a careful deﬁ-
nition of the parameters and deﬁnitions of the simulation's environment needs to be
documented, in order to ensure that these simulations can be repeated for testing
purposes.
This section will cover the overarching parameters of the system, fundamental to
any basic simulation. These deﬁnitions are necessary before discussing the simple
simulations covered in Section 5.4.
5.2.1 IPv4 Addressing Parameters
IPv4 simulations present many challenges, perhaps the most signiﬁcant of which is in
the structure of networks. In Paxson and Floyd (1997), the challenge of simulating
heterogeneous networks is discussed.
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It was decided that a simple tree structure for the network, using basic subnetting,
would suﬃce for network structures. The Internet would be divided into 256 class A
networks, which would be divided into a further 256 class B networks, and so on. Each
subnet would have a `gateway' host, the ﬁrst addressed host on the network (thus the
gateway for 192.168.0.0/16 class C network would be 192.168.0.0, and the gateway for
the 146.231.0.0/16 class B would be 146.231.0.0). This also means that the `parent'
node, through which all of the highest levels of packets pass, is 0.0.0.0. This presents
a signiﬁcant bottleneck if the number of packets forwarded in a discrete time unit is
limited to a certain quantity.
This is obviously a vast oversimpliﬁcation of real world network structures, however
for simple simulations, it can be considered suﬃcient.
Nodes in the IPv4 network are all implemented as subclasses of the abstract `IPv4'
node class, thus controlling nodes that may be added into such a network. By deﬁnition,
they all contain an address, as well as a connection link to their `gateway'.
In order to simulate the way in which a default route works, all packets are addressed
to the intended recipient, then sent via an IPv4 connection object to the `gateway' node
for the network on which the sending node is located. On message interpretation, the
gateway node then decides what to do with the packet, depending on the packet's
recipient node:
• If the recipient node is directly connected to the gateway that receives the packet,
such as 192.168.0.0 receiving a packet for 192.168.0.15 (in which case the message
is forwarded to the recipient)
• If the recipient node belongs to a diﬀerent subnet, such as 192.168.0.0 receiving a
packet for 146.231.1.15 (in which case the message is forwarded onto the gateway's
own `default route' to be processed again)
• If the recipient node is within the gateways subnet but not attached to the gate-
way, such as 192.0.0.0 receiving a packet for 192.168.0.1 (in which case the mes-
sage is forwarded to the next logical gateway in the sequence)
• If the recipient node is the gateway, then it interprets the packet as a standard
node
In order to reduce memory consumption, network nodes have also been developed.
Network nodes, another IPv4 sub-class, allow IPv4 packets to be received, and represent
any form of network, at any point in the IPv4 structure. Because of its abstract nature,
a network node could represent forms of network other than the tree type that the one-
to-one simulated hosts represent.
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5.2.2 Host Parameters
When considering hosts upon the simulated Internet, certain assumptions must be
made about the the hosts' properties. Because many of the worms that were to be
simulated required either a certain operating system or a certain software package to be
installed, when node objects were instantiated they had random properties associated
with them.
Two sets of assumptions have been made when determining the properties of nodes:
• The ﬁrst set of assumptions regards the actual distribution of properties. No ac-
curate data is obtainable about the nature of computers connected to the Internet
- in Paxson and Floyd (1997), the authors comment on the largely unmeasurable
nature of the Internet. As a result, the values used were chosen with as much
accuracy to the current state of the Internet as was available.
The values were chosen with inﬂuences from Pang et al. (2004) and Net Applica-
tions (2008), researchers who have studied the Internet and attempted to make
inferences about its composition.
• The second set of assumptions is speculative - it is assumed that at some point
further development may take place using parameters that have not been used in
the simulations discussed in this document. As a result, parameters speciﬁed here
may include operating systems, software, or other information not immediately
useful to this research, but may be useful for later simulations.
When a host is instantiated, it begins with randomly determined properties. Some of
these properties that are stated are not used in the simulations in this research - this is
for easier later development, and the chosen properties can easily be edited, changed,
removed or added to by adjusting values in a conﬁguration ﬁle. These properties are
as shown below:
• 70% chance to be a Windows OS
If so, then:
 5% chance to be Windows Vista
 40% chance to be Windows XP
 35% chance to be Windows 2000
 20% chance to be some other version of Windows
 Whichever version of Windows, there is also the following chance of software
being installed on the system:
∗ 10% WebDAV (for Welchia infection)
∗ 30% IIS version 4 (for Code Red vII)
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∗ 5% ISS (for Witty)
• 20% chance to be a GNU/Linux OS
If so, then:
 60% chance to be Ubuntu Linux
 20% chance to be Fedora Linux
 20% chance to be an unknown Linux distribution
• 10% chance to be some other OS
If so, then:
 50% chance to be some version of FreeBSD
 50% chance to be some other, less popular OS
5.2.3 Protocol Parameters
TCP/IP is the only protocol on the OSI stack to be simulated, corresponding to layer
three and four. This corresponds to the form of worms simulated - they operated
primarily using TCP/IP.
Only IPv4 was simulated - IPv6 would be a simple extension, but was not included
due to intial concerns regarding the large scale. It could be explored further using a
large enough system of the Grid based simulator as discussed in Section 4.4.
5.2.4 Traﬃc Parameters
Non-relevant network traﬃc was not representationally simulated. Latency and band-
width limitations are implied as delays and queues are in place, but due to eﬃciency
challenges, they were not included in the simulations.
5.2.5 Time Parameters
Simulations were typically run in time `ticks', running from time one through ten
million), though in several cases where execution time became unreasonably high, sim-
ulation execution times were reduced to one million ticks and these cases are noted in
the speciﬁc experiments.
The time it takes for a packet to be sent over a single network connection is a single
tick. This can be increased (and is for some of the later malware simulations) in order
to model latency, showing that the system is conﬁgurable. Because time is abstracted
in these simulations, the meaning of a tick depends on the simulation - future users of
the system can associate a tick to suit their simulations' requirements.
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5.3 Test Format
Tests that will be performed will be detailed using the format below.
5.3.1 Statement of Subject
Figure 5.1: Simulation 1: Creating Components
The subject of the simulation is clearly stated in this section, speciﬁcally for purposes
of later testing. By stating the subject before simulation takes place, the results may
refer back speciﬁcally to the subject statement and thus be evaluated objectively and
independent of any other notable results observed in the simulation.
Where appropriate, diagrams will be included in the subject statement to clarify the
setup of the simulation. The symbols used in the diagrams can be seen in Figure 5.1.
5.3.2 Statement of Parameters
Any parameters speciﬁc to a simulation are outlined so that later researchers may
repeat these simulations for their own validation. This section will be as thorough as
possible, but will focus speciﬁcally on parameters that are diﬀerent from those used
previously, or diﬀerent from those normally used, detailed in the previous chapter.
5.3.3 Statement of Results
The results of the simulation will be stated, and shown in summary (either in table
form, in statistical analysis, or by visualisation). At this stage, conclusions will not be
drawn from the results further than noting anomalous behaviour or marked diﬀerences
from the expected results.
Where appropriate, ellipses have been used to reduce sample outputs for the sake of
brevity. In these cases, additional result examples may be found in Appendix B.
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5.4 Component and Network Simulation Testing
Before the simulator can be used to test advanced concepts (such as Internet worms), it
must ﬁrst be conﬁrmed that it's basic components and fundamental operations behave
in an expected manner. The following tests were devised to determine this.
5.4.1 Rationale for Simulations
The simulations in this section were selected as a series of increasing complexity, testing
the fundamental components and behaviours of the simulator. The ﬁrst simulation,
component creation, tests that the simulator is capable of creating and maintaining
components in memory. The second simulation, connectivity testing, tests the ability
of the simulator to successfully communicate over the network. The third simulation,
routing, extends the communication testing to a non-trivial level. Layered network-
ing tests the ability of the simulator to model modern multi-protocol networking by
modeling protocol encapsulation, which is an imperative part of a simulator that can
scale resolution. Network node simulation also tests resolution scaling by abstracting
an entire network, an important aspect in Internet-scale simulation. Finally, the last
simulation of this chapter combines routing and network nodes in preparation for the
testing in the following chapter which will make use of this pattern.
5.4.2 Component Creation
The ﬁrst simulation that must take place is the creation of the components used in
the system. Nodes, connections, packets and actions must be instantiated, and tested
thoroughly within the bounds of the simulation. The core functionality of each (nodes'
ability to hold information, connections' capabilities to connect nodes and so on) must
be tested as well.
Statement of Subject
In this test, the creation of components is the core subject. Each type component
should be created and added into the system, then tested to see whether the simulation
can maintain these components intact in memory for the duration of its execution.
Furthermore, the claim that arbitrary parameters can be added to components
should be tested - some components must have semantics added and later extracted to
determine whether they remain stable in memory.
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Statement of Parameters
The test shall create a node, and assign it an address (an arbitrary piece of informa-
tion associated with the node, as not all nodes have an address intrinsically). It will
then attempt to extract this information from the node and test whether it remains
unchanged since input.
The test must then create another node, and create a connection that connects it to
the node that has already been created. A packet component should then be created,
and a message associated with it. Finally, an action component should be instantiated
and added to the simulation global scheduler - it should test whether the address
associated with the nodes remains the same after some simulated period of time has
passed.
Statement of Results
The output from the simulator is as shown below:
Node created
Address assigned
Address remains in the node
Created and connected another node
Creating default packet
Created a packet
Created an action
(A time tick passes)
Address A remains the same over time
Address B remains the same over time
This output (which uses a more verbose set of components than those used in later
simulations) explicitly shows each stage of the component instantiation and testing
process, demonstrating successfully that components of all types can be created in the
system, and their operation remains stable over time.
5.4.3 Connectivity
Connectivity needs to be tested as a core part of the networking simulation. Connection
objects would have been created as part of the last simulation test, but connectivity
must test the ability of the network to transfer packets between hosts. This level of
simulation does not require any speciﬁc actions to take place when packets arrive, or
generate more than a few packets - it just has to send them correctly from one node
to another, via a connection object.
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Statement of Subject
Figure 5.2: Simulating Connectivity
The focus of this test is to determine whether connectivity - a core concept in net-
working - operates correctly and successfully in the simulation. The simulator must
create nodes and connections, then pass packet components over those connections.
The node behaviour must be set to test and report the payload of any packets it
receives in order to determine whether the payload remains intact.
Statement of Parameters
The simulator must create some node objects (in the simplest case, two), and a connec-
tion object, connecting the nodes. It must then create a packet object with a payload
or messsage, and queue its sending on one of the nodes. The connection object must
then be used to extract the packet from the node, and successfully transport it to
the other node. Finally, the receiving node must extract the packet from its incoming
queue, and interpret it by testing whether the payload retains integrity.
Statement of Results
The output from the simulator is as shown below:
Sending packet.
Packet arrived, payload: Packet Payload
This output shows the sending node stating that the packet is in the process of sending.
When the receiving node receiveds the packet successfully, it prints the payload - this
shows the simulation successfully sent the packet.
5.4.4 Routing
Once connectivity has been established, routing can be implemented. As part of the
implementation of routing, it is required that several important aspects of modern
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networking are also included, particularly addressing and the concept of a default
route.
Statement of Subject
Figure 5.3: Simulating Routing
The test requires multiple nodes created, explicitly without a mesh network, as shown
in Figure 5.3. Through the use of default routes and routing tables, it is possible for
messages sent from host A to be sent to host B when A and B are not directly connected,
but a route does exist that connects them both.
The concept used for routing, in this case, is by attaching the attribute default
route to nodes in the simulation, stipulating which host should receive packets should
they not be directly connected to the host that the message is to be sent to. Hosts in
the system also require a routing table which speciﬁes which hosts they are connected
to, or which hosts in the route will eventually lead to the destination. Once a packet
arrives at a routing host, it can be forwarded to the correct remote router, which can
then send the packet on to the speciﬁc destination host.
Statement of Parameters
For this simulation, nodes can have one of two behaviours, depending on which at-
tributes have been assigned to them: if a node does not have a routing table, it will
pass all packets it receives to the node speciﬁed in their default route attribute (which
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all nodes have), but if it has a routing table attribute (which stores speciﬁc nodes
with their addresses as keys) and the destination is in the routing table, it will attempt
to send the packet to its speciﬁed destination.
When the simulation starts, it creates two networks (called A and B for this expla-
nation), each containing two normal nodes (with no routing tables) and one router
node (which has routing tables). It connects the normal nodes of A to the router
node of A, and similarly connects the normal nodes of B to the router node of B, then
connects the router nodes - all via connection objects. Finally, it creates two packets,
one in network A, another in network B, addressed to nodes in the network B and A
respectively. They are then instructed to send these packets.
The nodes in network A and B are set with their routers as default routes, while
the routers have their default routes set to the other router (which is unrealistically
simple, but will suﬃce for testing).
The packets should arrive in their respective routers, then, when testing shows that
the destinations are not found in the routing tables, should be forwarded to those
router's default routes. When they arrive in the remote routers, they should then be
forwarded to the destinations speciﬁed in the routing tables, and so then ﬁnally arrive
at their destinations.
Statement of Results
The output from the simulator is as shown below:
Packet arrived. Routing. (Packet 1 Router A)
Packet arrived. Routing. (Packet 1 Router B)
Packet arrived. Payload: Packet Payload 1
Packet arrived. Routing. (Packet 2 Router B)
Packet arrived. Routing. (Packet 2 Router A)
Packet arrived. Payload: Packet Payload 2
This output shows packets arriving at various nodes. Where routing takes place, the
router is stated in parantheses at the end of the line. If the packet arrives at it's correct
destination, the payload is shown.
5.4.5 Layered Networking
Modern networking uses a stack abstraction to model the various layers of protocols
used in communication, detailed in Chapter 2. The conceptual model of a networking
stack is implemented by wrapping high-level protocols' traﬃc in low-level protocols
packets. The simulation of this concept can be performed by allowing the message of
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the packet objects to be a generic datatype, which can (via object-oriented inheritance
of packet objects the generic datatype) include higher-level packet objects.
This simulation test will test the simulator's capacity to include traﬃc at any level,
while encapsulating the data from higher levels.
Statement of Subject
Figure 5.4: Multi-Layered Network Simulation
In this test, the focus is on representing real-world multiple-layered protocols. This
is represented by introducing several levels of detail speciﬁc to certain layers of net-
working.
Packets no longer include addressing as a seperate sub-entity: addressing is now
made as part of the message, and extracted as a header. This is also complicated
by adding an optional (dependant on size) fragmentation element to the way in which
messages are passed. Messages, in this test, must be able to be passed using a high-level
of abstraction (to represent a high-level protocol using networking libraries to abstract
networking details), such as Send the message `example' from host A to host B, but
be `wrapped' in a lower protocol in the networking stack (as they would be by those
libraries) and be reassembled into its initial state on ﬁnal reception. This process is
demonstrated in Figure 5.4.
This simulation passes a message with a high-level abstraction, which is then wrapped
in an addressed header and fragmented if necessary (as it would be using TCP/IP). On
reception, a node will interpret these packets by stripping the headers (but retaining
the information they store), reassembling the data, and ﬁnally displaying the results.
Statement of Parameters
The simulation will use the network assembled for the previous test: four normal
nodes connected to two routers that are themselves connected. Two messages will
be prepared: one that is larger than 1500 bytes (which ensures that normal IP will
fragment it into multiple packets), and one that is smaller. Both must be sent, but
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must be transformed into the multi-layered form. Once they arrive, both packets must
then be examined and display the original message used.
Statement of Results
The simulator successfully routed packets between two non-adjacent nodes on the net-
work (using the routing established from the previous simulation). By displaying in-
coming packets at a raw level, then once they had been stripped of headers, then
again once a complete message had been reassembled, it was clear that multi-protocol
simulations were possible.
5.4.6 Network Nodes
One concern of simulation is the eﬃciency of memory and processor use. One of the
most common ways to improve on this eﬃciency is abstraction of large portions of
the network. Network nodes are nodes that play the role of abstracted networks. By
allowing a single node to behave as a whole network, the focus of the optimisation of
the simulator can move from node size and access to packet movement.
The abstraction of network nodes, however, can only hope to retain accuracy if
they can operate similarly to networks (in terms of the parameters of the simulation).
This added challenge must therefore include elements of randomness (with associated
probabilities to ensure measurable similarity to the object they model) that will lead
to possible diﬀerences from observed data.
Statement of Subject
Figure 5.5: Simulating a Network Node
In this simulation, a network node must be created and attached (via a standard
connection object) to a normal (host) node (as shown in Figure 5.5). It should
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receive addressed packets and interpret them by storing the information eﬃciently (in
this case, by storing the packet information but discarding the packet payload). Once
the simulation has completed, the information stored by the network node must then
be displayed for analysis.
Statement of Parameters
A single host node and a single network node must be created, and attached via a
simple connection object. The network node's behaviour can be deﬁned as pure storage
at this stage: it merely records the destination addresses of packets that it receives.
For testing, several million packets should be sent to show that a network node is an
eﬀective means of packet information storage.
Statement of Results
[...]
15.63.177.88 -> 2
194.6.13.195 -> 2
26.76.165.177 -> 2
59.1.6.220 -> 2
Single IP hits -> 1999082
This output shows the number of received packets at each IP address (sorted in de-
scending order), and accumulates the number of IPs that received only a single packet.
This shows that a wide variety of broadly-spaced IPs received packets.
5.4.7 Mixing Node Types
The example shown in Simulation 5 (Section 5.4.6 above) initially appears contrived -
routing has been removed from the example, so all packets sent to the network node
are logged - even packets which are not destined for the network that it represents.
To display network nodes in the context of a complete network simulator, a more
elaborate example has been constructed using several of the networking simulation
fundamentals already tested. A network with several nodes, each with their own routing
and seperate node information should be constructed for this test, and a large number
of packets originating from each of them with a variety of destinations (both for the
network node and for the other hosts) allows a more stringent framework for testing
the usefulness of these components.
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Figure 5.6: Simulating a Mixture of Components
Statement of Subject
This test exists to bring together the individual aspects of networking simulation that
have been used so far and to construct a simulated network that can be used for later
simulations. Several host nodes (in the example used here, sixteen) should be created
and semantic information should be inserted, such as addressing, routing, etc. They
should be mesh-connected, and one of them should act as a router with an Internet
connection as a default route to a network node. This network node, then, should
collect packets and store their information.
A large number of packets should then be created (several million) and placed in the
outgoing-queues of randomly selected host nodes on the network. These packets should
be randomly addressed (some speciﬁcally to other nodes in the local network, others
speciﬁcally outside of the network), and once placed in the queues, should immediately
be sent.
Once the simulation has completed, the network node and the host nodes should
report on the number of packets they have received.
Statement of Parameters
The above statement of subject covers all required details and parameters for the
purposes of this simulation.
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Statement of Results
The results have been reduced for the sake of brevity, see Appendix B for additional
results.
[...]
79.71.252.97 -> 2
51.98.142.195 -> 2
87.204.163.26 -> 2
57.98.78.255 -> 2
17.197.37.120 -> 2
Single IP hits -> 979733
This output shows the number of received packets at each IP address (sorted in de-
scending order), and accumulates the number of IPs that received only a single packet.
5.5 Discussion of Results
In this chapter, aselection of tests were applied to the simulator developed for this work
in order to test the basic functionality. Simulations began with simple system tests to
conﬁrm the basic operations - plugins and communication - and then advanced to model
routing and protocol stacks, ﬁnally modeling a single complex network connected to a
simulated Internet. The simulations found that the simulator was working as expected.
5.5.1 Simulation Results
The results of the networking tests are all as expected - the networking functions of
the simulator work as designed, and are capable of handling large volumes of traﬃc
(millions of ticks and packets).
5.5.2 Simulator Results
The results discussed in this chapter show that the simulator meets the goals set out
for it in that:
• it is capable of a selection of network simulations
• it is able to operate at several levels of abstraction,
• it is scalable from the level of directly simulated networks and with the use of
abstraction to the operation of networks simulations at the Internet scale.
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The simulator that was developed also met several less tangible goals which were set
out for development (see Section 2.6.2): It was shown to be highly modular (with many
plugins already written for easy use by potential researchers - See Appendix C for a
brief listing), and exceptionally platform independant, executing simulations on at least
three diﬀerent primary operating system platforms. Actual test implementations were
run on Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, FreeBSD and Ubuntu Linux.
Finally, it was found that the simulator also supports rapid plugin development.
Node plugins, requiring the most complex development, typically required rewriting
up to two methods, each of approximately one hundred lines of C# code. Connection
and action plugins required less development, and packet objects never required any.
This is encouraging and meets one of the most important high-level goals of the work
- to be useful for rapid response security simulation in research.
5.6 Summary
The research and simulations performed in this chapter show that the basic assumptions
that the simulator needed to fulﬁll in order to begin development of complex simulations
were in place. The simulator in Section 5.4.2 was shown to be capable of instantiating
a variety of modular plugins successfully. Section 5.4.3 demonstrated that it could
successfully model connectivity between two nodes, and Section 5.4.4 extended this
with packet routing. Section 5.4.5 demonstrated that the simulator was capable of
layered networking by wrapping data of a diﬀerent protocol within a packet. Finally,
Section 5.4.6 brought all these concepts together into a complex simulation. All of
these simulations made use of the parameters stated earlier in the chapter, in Section
5.2.
Based on the validation of the functional components of the simulator, the following
chapter presents simulations of malware and security countermeasures to that malware
that test the ability of the simulator to model these concepts in real life.
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6 Malware and Advanced
Simulations
6.1 Introduction
This chapter continues with the simulations described in the previous chapter. Whereas
Chapter 5 established the capability of the simulator to adequately represent network-
ing at a varying levels of complexity, this chapter elaborates, with simulations meant
to test the system's capabilities as a representational simulator.
Section 6.2 proposes the malware, worm and advanced simulations which will be
used in this chapter.
Section 6.3 introduces additional parameters used for the malware simulation in this
chapter.
Section 6.5 begins the documentation of simulations by introducing the visualisation
technique that is used throughout this chapter.
Section 6.6 focuses on worm simulation, covering the simple simulated case then
carrying on to simulate the Witty, Code Red vII, Blaster and Welchia worms, as
discussed in Section 2.4.
As this is the core of the chapter, the contents are explored here in more depth:
Initially, a conceptual worm was simulated to explore and test the concept of an
Internet worm. This is detailed in Section 6.6.1. This was then extended to model the
relatively simple Witty worm, in Section 6.6.2. The Code Red vII worm added degrees
of complexity in scanning algorithms, and its simulation is described in 6.6.3. Finally,
the Blaster and Welchia worms are detailed in Sections 6.6.4 and 6.6.5 respectively.
Section 6.7 introduces two advanced simulations - simulating a malicious worm and
a helpful worm simultaneously to gauge the eﬀectiveness of this counter-worm strategy,
and modeling the eﬀects of a network telescope.
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6.2 Proposed Worm Simulations and Expected
Outcomes
As a standard set of plugins was being constructed, a toolkit for worm simulation
became a possibility. A `worm propogation' action component was constructed, and
was designed for modularity. Once development of a general worm concept had been
completed, the worms to be modeled were selected. Presented here are the worms that
were chosen for simulation.
Simple Worm Simulation Showing the eﬀects of a simple worm that randomly scans
and infects (such as that documented in Section 6.4.1), this initial simulation case
was designed as a test for the use of worms in the simulation, as well as a starting
point for further worm development. Simple scanning and perfect infection rates
allow this simulation to show the full eﬀects of a random scanning worm, and
testing the full eﬀects of a worm that could infect a large portion of the Internet
very quickly.
Witty Simulation Described in Section 6.4.2, the Witty worm should show very rapid
propogation compared to other worms (due to its connectionless infection), but
the spread should be more random. This worm adds an additional level of com-
plexity to the simulation by adding non-perfect infection. Documentation on this
worm can be found in Section 2.5.3.
Blaster Simulation The ﬁrst `real worm' simulation to be run, simulating the Blaster
worm that is described in Section 6.4.4. This simulation adds additional layers
of complexity to the simulator by using a more complex scanning algorithm, and
adding additional requirements for the infection determination. In the case of
a single host simulated, it is expected to see a large quantity of packets sent
to a single class C netblock. For more accurate simulations, many full class C
networks should be completely scanned. Documentation on this worm can be
found in Section 2.5.3.
Code Red II Simulation Described in Section 6.4.3, the Code Red vII worm should
display more traﬃc in the local networks than the Blaster simulation mentioned
above, for each single host infection. This worm adds additional complexity to
these simulations by adding a more complex scanning algorithm, resulting in ob-
servable patterns in the results which aid in testing. When simulating the eﬀects
of Code Red vII over a fully simulated Internet, class A and B networks should
show much higher saturation than for Blaster or Simple worm cases. Documen-
tation on this worm can be found in Section 2.5.2.
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Generic Red vs. Blue Simulation In testing malware countermeasures, Red vs. Blue
worm simulations are of interest. By simulating two worms at once, this simu-
lation stresses the simulator and tests it's capability to simulate more complex
actions. Discussed in Section 4.2.4, this initial simulation will use Simple worms,
as discussed earlier, for both the malicious (classed as Red) and helpful (classed
as a Blue) worms. This simple case will test the mechanics of Red vs. Blue
worms instead of trying to extract any interesting semantic information about
helpful worms as a malware countermeasure.
Blaster vs. Welchia Simulation The Welchia worm (described in Sections 2.5.3 and
6.4.5) removed the Blaster worm from infected computers, being perhaps the
most famous of the helpful worms (though it did much damage in the process,
so the term helpful might be incorrect). This simulation will test the eﬀects of
these two worms upon the Internet. It is expected that in cases where the worm
spread is at all limited, the intersection of the two worms' scans will be small, and
show little eﬀect. If the two worms are allowed free reign over full-scale Internet
simulations, the amount of intersection should be much larger.
Blaster vs. Network Telescope Simulation Network telescopes (introduced in Sec-
tion 4.2.4) are one tool that is used in the defence against network-aware malware.
Network telescopes can be considered to be a special case of a Network node ob-
ject, so addressed packets to the node may be handled in a diﬀerent manner if the
node is ﬂagged as a telescope. In this case, certain host nodes upon the simulated
Internet will have an additional parameter to those mentioned in Section 5.2.2 -
it will be marked as listening to the telescope. If the telescope is scanned by an
infected host, then the host's IP address will be added to a blacklist. Telescope-
ﬂagged hosts will ignore all packets received from blacklisted hosts.
This simulation demonstrates the simulator's capability to model non-worm com-
plex components, as well as demonstrating a complex node type that has useful
and non-standard behaviours.
The expected result of this is largely dependent on the worms running in the
simulation. The Blaster worm, used in this case, is anticipated to have a slightly
slower propogation rate.
6.3 Further Parameter Speciﬁcations
The simulations presented here require further parameter speciﬁcations to remain re-
producable. In this section, additional parameters will be introduced.
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The parameters from the previous chapter detailed in Section 5.2 remain valid
throughout the simulations in this chapter.
6.3.1 Common Worm Parameters
A host, once infected, will continue to send out new packets continually (every time
tick in which the worm activates, dependant on the forms of the worms) and eternally
(never stopping for the entire simulation).
6.3.2 Setup Parameters
In the case of individual node simulations, the initial infection took place on a host
with IP address 192.168.0.1, a host on the list of IANA reserved private network ranges
(documented in (IANA)) - though technically it is simulated as directly internet-
facing.
In the case of subnet simulations, the Class C network 192.168.0.0/28 is simulated,
a subnet of an IANA-reserved network (explained in Rekhter et al. (1996)).
In the case of Red vs. Blue worms, the malicious worm's initial infection will be on
host 192.168.0.1, and the `beneﬁcial' worm initial infection will be on host 192.168.0.8.
These initial IP addresses are signiﬁcant, as the visualisations of the scanning will
show: many worms use localised scanning, so the simulated reserved network will
receive the majority of the scan attempts.
6.4 Programmed Worm Parameters
6.4.1 Simple Worm
The simplest worm has perfect infectability, infecting hosts regardless of details such as
operating system or software running. It may use either a random scanning algorithm
(selecting the next host to infect independant of the previously selected host), or an
incremental scanning algorithm (considering IP addresses to be 32-bit integers, starting
counting from 0 up to 232 − 1). Results are discussed in 6.6.1.
6.4.2 Witty
The Witty worm was discovered on the 19th of March 2004 and used an exploit in ISS,
an Internet security package, documented by Gatti et al. (2004), to gain access to a
host.Once the host was infected, Witty would overwrite a random section of the hard
drive, then send 20,000 UDP infection packets to randomly generated IP addresses.
Because the infection was contained in a single UDP packet, it spread very quickly.
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Once the 20,000 packets had been sent, it would seek to another random section of the
hard disk and overwrite it, beginning the cycle of overwrite-infect again.
Programming Speciﬁcs
For the Witty worm, if a worm infection packet arrived at a node, it would only infect
the host if its operating system was Windows (which we simulate as having a 70%
chance of occurring), running ISS (which is simulated to occur on 5% of Windows
hosts).
Using a Bayesian decision tree, it was then determined that the probability of a
computer being infectable by the Witty worm is:
0.7× 0.05 = 0.035
So when an infection packet was received by the Internet node, it would be considered
a successful infection of the Witty worm with probability 0.035. The simulation of the
Witty worm is detailed in Section 6.6.2.
6.4.3 Code Red vII
The Code Red vII worm has been extensively documented, as shown in Section 2.5.2.
Released on August 4, 2001, it exploited a buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerability in Microsoft IIS
servers Microsoft (2003c). Its scanning algorithm, explained in Friedl (2001), selects
new hosts to infect by doing the following:
For the purposes of this example, consider a Code Red vII-infected host with IP
address A.B.C.D:
The infected host generates a random IP address of the form W.X.Y.Z. It then
proceeds randomly, by selecting a value between 1 and 8, and scans as follows:
• If the value is one, it will scan W.X.Y.Z
• If the value is between two and ﬁve (inclusive), it will scan A.X.Y.Z
• If the value is between six and eight (inclusive), it will scan A.B.Y.Z
If the randomly generated address falls into the 224.0.0.0/8, or multicast address space,
or the 127.0.0.0/8, or loopback address space, then it will reselect the random address.
Programming Speciﬁcs
For the Code Red vII worm, if a worm infection packet arrived at a node, it would
only infect the host if its operating system was Windows (which had a 70% chance of
occurring), and it had IIS installed (which had a 30% chance of occurring).
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Using a Bayesian decision tree, it was then determined that the probability of a
Windows host running IIS was:
0.7× 0.3 = 0.21
So when an infection packet was received by the Internet node, it would be a con-
sidered a successful infection of the Code Red vII worm with probability 0.21. The
simulation of the Code Red vII worm is detailed in Section 6.6.3.
6.4.4 Blaster
The Blaster worm was discovered on the Internet on August 11, 2003, and uses an
exploit in Microsoft Windows' DCOM RPC Interface Buﬀer to gain access to Windows
XP and Windows 2000 computers, as explained by Dougherty et al. (2003) and detailed
in Microsoft (2003a) and Microsoft (2003b).
The Blaster worm forms the scanning target's IP address through one of two ways,
according to Knowles and Perriott (2003):
• There is a 40% probability that it will choose an address A.B.R1.R2, where A
and B are the ﬁrst and second bytes (respectively) of the address of the host that
is sending the attack, and R1 and R2are randomly generated in the range 0 to
255.
• There is a 60% probability that is will generate a random address.
The scanning algorithm selects it's targets as follows: a target host is selected by
generating a random IP address of the form A.B.C.0, where A, B and C are all random
integers in the range 0 to 254. There is a 40% chance, if C is greater than 20, that it
will be reduced by a random value between 1 and 20. It will then proceed to scan the
entire class C network, incrementing from 0 to 254.
The exploit that Blaster uses diﬀers slightly between Windows 2000 and Windows
XP - every scan that takes place has a 20% chance to use the Windows 2000 attack
vector, and an 80% chance to use the Windows XP attack vector.
Simulation Programming Speciﬁcs
For the Blaster worm, if a worm infection packet arrived at a node, it would generate a
random number between 1 and 100 - it would only infect the host if it was a Windows
2000 host (a host was running Windows 70% of the time, and given it was running
Windows, it would be Windows 2000 35% of the time) and the number was less than
or equal to 20 or a Windows XP host (a host was running Windows 70% of the time,
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and given it was running Windows, it would be Windows XP 40% of the time) and the
number was higher than 20.
Using a Bayesian decision tree, it was then determined that the probability that a
scanned machine was an infectable Windows XP host was
0.7× 0.4 = 0.28
and the probability that the host was infectable and ran Windows 2000 was
0.7× 0.35 = 0.245
So when an infection packet was received by the Internet node, it would be a consid-
ered a successful infection of the Blaster worm with probability 0.28 + 0.245 = 0.525.
The simulation of the Blaster worm is detailed in Section 6.6.4.
6.4.5 Welchia
The Welchia worm was devised to counter the Blaster worm. Documented in Perriot
(2008), it was ﬁrst discovered on August 18, 2003, and uses a variety of exploits to gain
access to Windows 2000 and Windows XP hosts, most notably the same exploits used
by the Blaster worm (see Microsoft (2003a) and Microsoft (2003b)).
When Welchia infects a host, it deletes any trace of the Blaster worm from the host's
hard drive and memory. It then proceeds to scan for further infections - its scanning
algorithm (explained in Perriot (2008)) chooses one of the following two patterns for
infection:
• Consider the current host to have IP address A.B.C.D - Welchia then incremen-
tally scans A.B.0.0 through to A.B.255.255
• Selects a random IP address
Once a target has been determined, Welchia continues by exploiting either the same
vulnerability that Blaster uses (and leaves open), or a vulnerability in WebDAV, a
component in a webserver.
As Symantec does not state the probability of the scanning algorithms, various values
have been assumed. From simulation experiments performed in this research, some
success has been found with a 2% incremental scan probability and a 98% random
scanning probability.
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Programming Speciﬁcs
The Welchia worm used the same DCOM RPC exploit as Blaster did, with the inclu-
sion of an additional exploit in WebDAV (a component of the IIS web server). The
IIS/WebDAV exploit was much more targeted than the Windows RPC exploit, and
as a result would, using the parameters speciﬁed above, only infect a small proportion
more of the Internet than Blaster. The simulation of the Welchia worm is detailed in
Section 6.6.5.
6.5 Simulations
In this chapter, the simulator that was designed and detailed in the previous chapter is
rigorously tested through a variety of simulations. The results of these simulations are
then compared to some metric (depending on the subject of the simulation this could
be captured data, a conceptual common-sense model, or an analytical model), and
the diﬀerence evaluated in the next chapter.
The format used for these simulations remains the same as that used in the previous
chapter, as described in Section 5.3.
6.5.1 Statement of Results
The results of the simulation will be stated, and shown in summary. Where the design
of a simulation is not immediately apparent, diagrams have been used to display the
conﬁguration and execution of the simulation.
Hilbert Curves
A Hilbert curve (or Hilbert Space-Filling Curve) is a novel way to eﬃciently represent
a large quantity of 1-dimensional data using a 2-dimensional fractal curve. In Irwin
and Pilkington (2008), the authors describe a Hilbert curve as a continuous fractal
curve, the limit of which ﬁlls a square. The important property of the curve that
is relevant to IP space visualition according to the aforementioned authors, is that it
maintains locality of data on the curve - this means that data ordered a certain way in
one dimension will still be ordered the same way along the curve in two dimensions.
(Irwin and Pilkington (2008)).
The Hilbert curves used here allow an ordered visualisation of all of IP space (with
some loss of detail due to the high resolution required) by fractally dividing a square
image into blocks of available IP addresses (ordered by signiﬁcance of byte in the IP
address), with the lowest values starting from the top left to the highest values in the
top right.
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An example of a Hilbert curve representing the ﬁrst octet of an IP address can be
seen in Figure 6.1, as shown in Irwin and Pilkington (2008).
The order of the curve is the number of fractal iterations it has undergone, which
(for a two-dimensional Hilbert curve) multiplies the number of points by four per
increased order. A ﬁrst order Hilbert curve has 4 points - the 4th, 8th, 12th and 16th
order curves have numbers of points corresponding to the number of class A, B and C
networks and individual hosts on the Internet respectively. which further adds to their
suaitability for use in IP network address visualisation.
Figure 6.1: Order 4 Hilbert Curve
Thus, the curve shown in Figure 6.1 can then be further divided for the next most
signiﬁcant octet (which will be order 8) and so on. For the purposes of illustration in
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this document, Hilbert curve visualisation will be limited to order 12 (each point on the
curve representing a group of 256 hosts which provides a logical mapping to a network
of size /24 in CIDR notation or a traditional Class C network) instead of individually
rendering each host, as the resultant curves would be too large (and the points too
small) for easy study. Where appropriate, further Hilbert curves with magniﬁcation
are also provided for explanation.
6.6 Worm Testing
As discussed in Section 4.2, Internet worms are an appropriate choice for subject simu-
lation, as they put stress on a simulation system and are well-documented for compari-
son. As a result, several worms were used to test the developed simulation system. The
worms chosen for simulation were selected on the basis of documentation and scaling
complexity: those worms which had scanning algorithms, exploits and other informa-
tion published allowed for better simulation modeling opportunities. The Witty worm
was selected due to its simplicity, while the Blaster and Welchia worms were selected
due to their complexity in contrast to the Witty worm.
6.6.1 Simple Worm
The simple worm case uses a worm with 100% infection probability, which randomly
scans across the entire IPv4 address space. While simplistic, this worm provides a
suitable starting point for the development of more complex worm simulations as it
already addresses the initial problems: generating packets in exponentially-growing
quantities, infections aﬀecting certain speciﬁc nodes, and so on.
Statement of Subject
The scenario to be simulated can be described as follows: a single host node in the
network detailed above (in simulation 6, Section 5.4.7) has been infected with a Simple
Worm. Simple Worms have a perfect infection rate (so every host that receives a
packet will immediately be infected, regardless of operating system, software, Internet
ﬁrewalls, etc.), and they spread by randomly scanning the Internet. The Simple Worm
also scans quickly: every simulated tick or time-period in the simulation will result
in every host that has been infected randomly infecting another host.
While this is an unrealistic example, it serves to provide a framework for all further
worm simulation: functions for scanning algorithms, likelihood of infection, and seper-
ate behaviours for host and network nodes will already be in place and can easily be
adapted for parameters of real worms for rapid development of real worm simulations.
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Statement of Parameters
The network as described above should be reconstructed (sixteen mesh-connected host
nodes with a router passing non-local traﬃc to a network node), and one randomly
determined node should be speciﬁed as infected.
The worm simulation should run for a large number of cycles (at least a million ticks),
and the results should then be documented. Due to the random scanning nature of the
worm, and the small size of the local network, it is unlikely that the worm will scan
a host node. Behaviours should be in place for this eventuality, and if a host node is
infected, it should immediately join the initial randomly chosen node in creating new
infection packets to send out.
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Statement of Results
Figure 6.2: Simple Worm Hilbert Curve
The Simple Worm, executing 1 000 000 ticks (implying 1 000 000 uniquely scanned
hosts) resulted in 1 000 000 infections distributed randomly. Note that only one million
ticks were simulated (most other simulations using ten times the number of ticks), as
the simulation became untenable due to the massive rate of infections, combined with
the perfect infection rate. The results are summarised in a Hilbert Curve, Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.3: Simple Worm Hilbert with Magniﬁcation
The Simple worm results are as expected - the worm has scattered values randomly
but uniformly across the entirety of IP space, with a very high density due to the perfect
infection rate and very high scan rate. They can be seen visualised and magniﬁed in
Figure 6.3.
6.6.2 Witty Worm
The Witty worm is mostly an extension of the simple worm, as it is also a random
scanning worm. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the worms can be noted in the infection
rate (Witty worm has several very speciﬁc requirements for systems which it can infect,
and as such has a much lower infection rate per packet sent out), but a much higher
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rate of packet sending, to represent the multi-threaded, small-packet way in which it
is spread.
Statement of Subject
The Witty worm is (in terms of parameters) very similar to the Simple Worm described
in simulation 7 (Section 6.6.1). It also uses random scanning, and also has a very fast
scanning rate.
The signiﬁcant diﬀerence is in the infection rate. As described in the previous chapter
(Section 6.6.2), the Witty worm has a low rate of infection (requiring both a Windows
host, and the ISS software to exploit) of 3.5%. This is represented in 96.5% of packets
that are received by the network node being dropped instead of logged, as they would
have been ineﬀectual in infection.
Statement of Parameters
The network described and used in Section 5.4.6 will suﬃce for this simulation, and
the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence to be implemented between these two worms is a much
smaller infection rate.
Again, only one host will be infected. This host will then proceed to attempt to infect
other hosts, but the likelihood of local infection (and thus an increase in scanning rate)
is low due to the random scanning algorithm.
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Statement of Results
Figure 6.4: Witty Infection Hilbert Curve
The Witty Worm, executing 10 000 000 ticks (implying 10 000 000 scanned hosts)
resulted in 129 970 infections distributed randomly.
The results are summarised in a Hilbert Curve, Figure 6.4.
The Witty worm is similar in all ways to the Simple worm (in that it randomly scans
uniformly across IP space, very rapidly), with an obvious lack of density due to the
comparatively low infection rate. As a result, no magniﬁcation of the results of this
simulation is necessary.
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Commentary
The Witty worm scanned randomly - so the expected results were a randomly dis-
tributed series of scans. Figure 6.4 conﬁrms that the simulator was eﬀective. Analysis
of the outputs reveals that the highest number of scans on a class C network was 3,
and the average number of scans per class C network was 1.00404 - indicating a very
broad, but very shallow random scan.
6.6.3 Code Red vII
The Code Red vII worm is the ﬁrst simulated worm with a more intelligent scanning
algorithm. While it has a higher infection likelihood than Witty, it speciﬁcally avoids
certain IP blocks (127.0.0.0/8 and 224.0.0.0/8 speciﬁcally, as these are special IANA
reserved networks - localhost and multicast networks respectively - documented in
(IANA)), and is more likely to scan locally than random scanning, as shown in the
work done by Friedl (2001).
Statement of Subject
The Code Red vII worm is the ﬁrst worm that will be simulated with a scanning
algorithm or pattern. It has a higher likelihood of scanning conceptually nearby
hosts than the Witty or Simple worms. It also exploits software more common than
Witty's (Code Red vII used an exploit in the Microsoft IIS web server, as documented
in Microsoft (2003c)), resulting in a much higher infection rate of 21%, but distributed
a much larger binary, and as a result transfer speeds were longer than Witty.
Statement of Parameters
The Code Red vII scanning algorithm was implemented as the real worm was pro-
grammed: the worm chose a random value between 0 and 7, then used the following
decision-making to determine the addresses to scan:
• if the value was 0, it would choose a random IP address to scan
• if the value was greater than 0 and less than 4, it would use the ﬁrst byte of the
sending host in the scanning address and the remainder of the IP was randomly
generated
• if the value was 4 or greater, then the ﬁrst two bytes of the sending host were used
in the scanning address and the remainder of the IP was randomly generated
To represent the higher infection rate, only 79% of the Code Red vII worms' packets
that are received by the network node are ignored. Finally, to represent the (relative)
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lack of speed in the spread of the worm due to bandwidth limitations, the time between
a node sending a worm packet and its arrival (and therefore its infections) is increased
from a single tick to a random number of ticks between 5 and 7.
Statement of Results
Figure 6.5: Code Red vII Infection Hilbert Curve
The Code Red vII Worm, executing 100000 ticks (implying approximately 17000 uniquely
scanned hosts) resulted in 4016 infections clearly clustered around the networks nearby
to the infecting computer (the 192.168.0.0/16 network, in this case). The results are
summarised in a Hilbert Curve, Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.6: Code Red vII Hilbert with Magniﬁcation
The Code Red vII worm shows the results of the scanning algorithm presented here.
Referring to the magniﬁcation of the visualisation of Simulation 9's results (Figure 6.6),
it can clearly be seen that the local class A network has been preferred, with a focus
on the local class B network, which can be seen as the darkened portion of the class A
network.
The other immediately noticeable part of the results is the lack of any activity in the
127.0.0.0/8 and 224.0.0.0/8 networks, as the scanning algorithm of the Code Red vII
worm speciﬁcally avoided both. This is seen as the large white blocks in the Hilbert
curve.
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Commentary
The Code Red vII worm was designed with three scanning modes that it chose ran-
domly: local (class C), local (class B) and entirely random. Thus, the expected output
was an intense, very focused local scan, a less intense loosely focused local scan and
a random scanning pattern otherwise, with the exception of two speciﬁc IP blocks:
the 127.0.0.0/8 network and the 224.0.0.0/8 network. Figure 6.6 conﬁrms that the
simulator has successfully simulated this.
6.6.4 Blaster
The Blaster worm, like the Code Red vII worm, has a higher infection rate than the
Witty worm, and also prefers local to global scanning.
Statement of Subject
The Blaster worm simulation uses a conceptually simpler but technically more advanced
scanning algorithm than the Code Red vII worm: it picks a random class C to begin
scanning, and completely scans all 254 IP addresses before randomly selecting another
network.
The Blaster worm was another (relatively) large worm that had to use multiple
packets for infection (thus slowing down propagation), but also had a very high in-
fection rate (because of the prevalence of Windows computers, the infection rate was
approximately 52.5%).
Statement of Parameters
The Blaster scanning algorithm operates as described above, with one additional mod-
iﬁcation: in 40% of cases where the third byte of the IP address was greater than
20, the value would be reduced by 20. Because many networks assign IP addresses in
ascending order, this resulted in a greater likelihood of infection. This was taken into
account in the scanning algorithm. In a similar manner to the Code Red vII simula-
tion, 47.5% of the Blaster worms' packets that are received by the network node are
ignored. To represent the (relative) lack of speed in the spread of the worm due to
bandwidth limitations, the time between a node sending a worm packet and its arrival
(and therefore its infections) is increased from a single tick to a random number of
ticks between 5 and 7.
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Statement of Results
Figure 6.7: Blaster Infection Hilbert Curve
The Blaster Worm, executing 100000 ticks (implying approximately 17000 scanned
hosts) resulted in 9772 infections clearly clustered into a few networks, the only ob-
servable pixels in the curve. The results are summarised in a Hilbert Curve, Figure
6.7.
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Figure 6.8: Blaster Hilbert with Magniﬁcation
The Blaster worm Hilbert curve (Figure 6.8) appears to simply be a random, uni-
formly distributed series of received packets. This appears so as a result of the granu-
larity of the Hilbert curve - the visualisation cannot show scans deeper than at a Class
C level.
Each dot on the curve shows a Class C network. If we examine the Blaster worm
scanning algorithm discussed in Section 6.4.4, we see that it completely scans a full
Class C network. Upon closer examination of the results, it can be seen that each Class
C network represented in the Hilbert curve has received many packets compared to the
Simple or Witty worms, where the Class C networks received much fewer packets each,
but the distribution was much broader.
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Commentary
The Blaster worm did a complete scan of a full class C network before randomly
selecting another class C network to scan. While Figure 6.7 doesn't completely show
this due to scaling problems, the magniﬁcation in Figure 6.8 shows that each individual
host in the network has been scanned - though only a portion of these are infected,
as the Blaster worm only exploited vulnerabilities in Windows hosts.
Thus, we can conclude that the simulation results are as expected - the Blaster
worm appears to select a random class C network to scan and then scans it completely,
infecting those nodes which would be vulnerable.
6.6.5 Welchia
The Welchia worm, while technically lacking a purpose (and a large body of infectable
hosts) without the Blaster worm, is another worm with a local-scanning priority and
good infection likelihood.
Statement of Subject
The Welchia worm was designed to counter the Blaster worm, and as a result normally
exploits a weakness that the Blaster worm exposes in systems that it infects. As a
result, the simulation of a Welchia worm without a Blaster worm relies on the other
form of infection that it used: a vulnerability in the WebDAV component of IIS version
5.0. This results in a much lower infection rate than if Blaster-compromised hosts were
available for the simulation.
The Welchia scanning algorithm operates similarly to Blaster, except that it scans
entire class B networks (i.e. 65536 hosts instead of 256). Otherwise, it is similar in
most respects to the Blaster worm.
Statement of Parameters
The Welchia worm will use the same simulation network as the other worm examples,
but operates by randomly selecting a class B network and completely scanning it: 256
networks of 256 hosts results in a very thorough network scan.
The Welchia worm ran multiple exploits in an attempt to gain access to the system.
This includes the DCOM RPC exploit used by the Blaster worm, referenced in Section
6.6.4 above. The other exploit it made use of was the WebDAV vulnerability in a
speciﬁc version of IIS.
This series of simulations assume that Windows hosts account for 60% of the Internet,
and that 2% of those hosts have the correct version of IIS with exploitable WebDAV
installed, resulting in a 1.2% infection rate assuming that Blaster is not a factor.
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Thus, the 52.5% that is calculated above (from the DCOM RPC vulnerability) com-
bined with the 0.57%1 representing the still-vulnerable hosts with the WebDAV vul-
nerability result in a 53.02% infection chance.
Statement of Results
Figure 6.9: Welchia Infection Hilbert Curve
The Welchia Worm, executing 100000 ticks (implying 17000 uniquely scanned hosts)
resulted in 238 infections (much less than the rest), all located in the same class B
1The remaining unexploited hosts represent 47.5% of hosts, with a 1.2% chance of infection: 0.475×
0.012 = 0.0057
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network - the dots on the curve represent approximately 64 class C subnetworks in the
190.31.0.0/16 network. The results are summarised in a Hilbert Curve, Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.10: Welchia Hilbert with Magniﬁcation
Contrasted to the Blaster results from the above section, the magniﬁed Welchia re-
sults (Figure 6.10) show the Welchia worm's results with much greater clarity. The
Welchia worm's scanning algorithm (see Section 6.4.5) show that it scans complete
Class B networks - comprised of a block of 256 Class C networks - and with magniﬁca-
tion, it becomes evident that this is what has occurred. By looking carefully at what
might otherwise appear to be large dots, we can see that the Welchia worm scans the
Class B network, but each Class C network within it has diﬀerent degrees of infection.
This corresponds with the expected results.
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Commentary
The Welchia worm completely scanned complete class B networks, which it chose at
random. This leads to the expectation that the results of simulating the Welchia worm
would be a few, randomly distributed networks which would be intensely scanned.
Figure 6.9 supports this - we can see that the Welchia worm has scanned uniformly
and randomly. This is further conﬁrmed in Figure 6.10, where magniﬁcation shows
that the dots where the worm scanned can be seen as thoroughly scanned. In a
similar manner to the other real worms in this chapter, it does not scan perfectly, as
it requires a certain software conﬁguration to be eﬀective. This eﬀect is seen by the
white areas in the magniﬁed curve.
6.7 Advanced Simulations
In this section, advanced simulations which are beyond the scope of Internet worms
are documented. These advanced simulations have been chosen to demonstrate the
practical value of this simulator - the concepts presented here are all valuable tools
in the ﬁeld of network security, and by testing the eﬀectiveness of these tools, the
simulator can be used as a fully-ﬂedged research tool.
6.7.1 Red vs. Blue (Simple vs. Simple)
The concept of Red vs. Blue worms pertains to the ﬁght ﬁre with ﬁre strikeback
concept of worm countermeasures. By creating a worm that uses the security holes
created by another worm, deleting the malicious worm, spreading and then deleting
itself, it hopes (conceptually) to work as a form of defence against malware.
Initial testing of the concept can use a pair of simple worms. Random scanning
means that there is a very low chance of collision between these two worms, but the
simpler implementation allows for more rapid testing of the concept.
Statement of Subject
The purpose of this simulation is to test the viability of a worm vs. worm concept.
Meaningful results are not expected, however in the following simulation a more inter-
esting and practical simulation will use the principles developed in this one.
The core subject of this simulation is a pair of lists of infected hosts, and speciﬁcally
noteworthy are any collisions in the lists - where an entry appears in both, the worms
have intersected. This would imply that the blue or helpful worm (helpful worms are
considered in Section 4.2.4) is eﬀective in removing an infection from a host.
113
Statement of Parameters
In this test, two nodes are infected with perfect random scanning worms (similar to
that used in Section 6.6.1, Simulation 7), each marked with a diﬀerent colour, which
is also speciﬁed in the packets they send. They are connected to a small local network
(16 nodes) with an attached network node. These nodes then proceed to send packets
which are collected by the network node, and are sorted into one of two infection lists,
depending on the worm's type.
At the end of the simulation, both worms are listed and any collisions are noted.
Statement of Results
The simulation completed and no worm intersection/collision occurred at all, over the
course of ten million ticks (approximately 9.9 million infection cycles for each worm).
A very large portion of the Internet was scanned by both worms (approximately 25%
of all Class C networks experienced a scan from each worm).
Commentary
This ﬁrst Red vs. Blue example was developed to prototype the concept - the expected
results were few collisions, with general random scanning, with no useful results beyond
testing the operation of the simulation. This was conﬁrmed - no collisions occurred,
and the simulation did not produce any noticeable patterns.
6.7.2 Red vs. Blue (Blaster vs. Welchia)
The classic Red vs. Blue worm case, the Welchia worm was released into the wild in
order to combat the Blaster worm. By exploiting a back door that the Blaster left
open, the Welchia worm rapidly spread across the Internet.
Statement of Subject
This simulation attempts to recreate the Blaster and Welchia worm scenario. The core
focus of this simulation is on the eﬀectiveness of the Welchia worm in ﬁnding Blaster-
infected hosts, and to determine whether its eﬀectiveness as a worm counter-measure
mitigates the possible problems that unleashing a worm presents.
Statement of Parameters
In a similar setup to the parameters used in Section 6.7.1, two nodes on a network
are infected with Blaster and Welchia worms and ten million ticks are executed by the
simulation engine. The signiﬁcant diﬀerence is the inclusion of non-perfect infection
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rates (corresponding to the values considered in Section 5.2.2) and the worm-speciﬁc
scanning algorithms.
Statement of Results
Figure 6.11: Red vs. Blue Worm Hilbert Curve
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Figure 6.12: Colour Red vs. Blue Worm Hilbert Curve
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Figure 6.13: Colour Red vs. Blue Worm Hilbert Curve with Magniﬁcation
The visualised results in Figure 6.11 are similar to a union of the Blaster and Welchia
worms simulated in Sections 6.6.4 and 6.6.5 respectively (as expected). Figures 6.12
and 6.13 show the results in colour, with Figure 6.13 magnifying a particular portion
of the network for further study.
One set of collisions occurred over the entire ten million tick simulation.
Commentary
The applied Blaster Red vs. Welchia Blue scenario presented in this simulation is based
on the Simple worm case developed in the previous simulation with extensions for the
two worms.
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It was expected that the Blaster worm and Welchia worm would operate as they
did in the simulations where they were used in isolation, but in the case of collision,
a high number of collisions would occur in a very small number of ticks. Because the
Blaster and Welchia worms both scan entire networks (class C and class B network
respectively), if a collision were to occur, the entire network of infected hosts would
be collisions. This was found to be the case for the 151.62.222.0/24 network, where
164 collisions took place. This high collision rate (note that the other 92 non-collisions
in the network would almost certainly be due to hosts that were not conﬁgured to be
vulnerable to the exploits used in the worms) conﬁrms that the simulation operates as
expected.
6.7.3 Network Telescope
The ﬁnal simulation concerns a form of Worm countermeasure testing. Network tele-
scopes, discussed in Chapter 2, can be used to ﬁnd infected hosts (or hosts with ma-
licious intent) and block them from sending traﬃc to a group of other hosts using
Real-Time Blackhole Lists.
This simulation tests the eﬀectiveness of this technology as a means of limiting the
amount of damage a worm can cause.
Statement of Subject
The focus of this simulation is the network telescope component. It operates in
the following way: if any packets are routed to a speciﬁc network (in this case, the
146.231.0.0/16 Class B network) then the sending host is recorded. Another set of net-
works (in this case, the 196.115.0.0/16 Class B network) subscribes to the telescope's
list (or RBL, Real-time Black-hole List), and will not be infected should they receive
packets from the hosts on the telescope's list.
The test associated with this simulation is to determine the usefulness of network
telescopes as tools for worm deterrence. If the telescope causes a notable diﬀerence in
worm scan patterns, then it will be deemed as an eﬀective tool.
Statement of Parameters
A single host on a small simulated network of 16 hosts is infected with a perfectly
infectious random-scanning worm. The networks speciﬁed above will be created with
the special cases they require (network telescope with RBL and RBL subscriber), and
the worm will be executed for one million ticks (corresponding to approximately 990
000 infection cycles). This is reduced from the default due to the rapid propagation
and perfect infection of the worm.
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Statement of Results
Figure 6.14: Network Telescope Hilbert Curve
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Figure 6.15: Magniﬁed Network Telescope Hilbert Curve
The ﬁnal result shows a similar snow or static eﬀect as seen in the Simple worm
simulation (Section 6.6.1) when visualised in Figure 6.14. Throughout the course of
the simulation, the network telescope was observed for usefulness, and it was found to
be eﬀective - approximately one hundred and ﬁfty infection packets over the course of
the full simulation were rejected as a result of the RBL.
While initially it appears that the scanning pattern shows no eﬀect, the protected
network can clearly be seen when magniﬁed, as shown in Figure 6.15.
This shows that the network telescope component did operate successfully, and eﬀec-
tively stopped the randomly scanning worms from infecting their protected network.
If the worm had used an ordered infection pattern (such as those used by the Blaster
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or Welchia worms) and the telescope was scanned ﬁrst, then it would have been more
eﬀective as a denser clustering of scans on the speciﬁc networks (telescope and sub-
scriber) could be expected. However, if the worm had ﬁrst infected the protected
network, it would have had no eﬀect at all.
Commentary
The network telescope simulation used a simulated network telescope to act as a worm
countermeasure. Within 10 000 ticks, all infectable hosts on the local network (16
in total) had been infected, and within 50 000 ticks all had been detected by the
telescope. As a result, no packets were detected in the 196.115.0.0/16 network - where
other networks typically experienced a range of `hits' between 130 and 180 packets,
the 196.115.0.0/16 network received no packets before the telescope had detected the
infecting host and added it to the RBL.
This is not what was expected - it is signiﬁcantly more eﬀective than originally
thought! The simulator did register approximately 150 hits that were blocked due to
the RBL, which is the expected response in the expected quantities. This does conﬁrm
the eﬀectiveness of the telescope, as well as the simulator's capability of modeling it.
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6.7.4 Advanced Simulations Results
Figure 6.16: Red vs. Blue worm with Magniﬁcation
The advanced simulations (Red vs. Blue worm and network telescope simulations)
both showed that the proposed worm countermeasures, while eﬀective if targeted, were
rarely useful due to the large size of IP space. In Figure 6.16 it is quite clearly possible to
see the Class B network that the Welchia worm infected, with nearby Class C networks
infected by Blaster. Throughout the entire course of the simulation, no collision took
place.
This does not mean that these worm defence tools were ineﬀective - it rather means
that they did not have an eﬀect on an Internet scale. They provided excellent security
for speciﬁc networks on the Internet, but were limited due to their lack of ubiquity.
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6.8 Other Simulators
In Section 2.6, two other major simulators were mentioned: ns-2 (as a simulator) and
SSFNet (as a simulator library). A further simulator was considered for comparison
in this research: the commercial network simulator OPNET (OPNET Technologies
(2009)). Due to restricted access, it was rejected as a possible simulator for comparison.
The other simulators (ns-2 and SSFNet) were available for comparison in this re-
search, but were not used due to resource and time constraints. The peculiarities of
their use (ns-2's use of dual-languages and emulation focus, and SSFNet's develop-
ment requirements) meant that this research could not be easily recreated for their
frameworks.
In addition to this, the indices used for simulator testing were not comparable.
The simulations that were executed were heavily investigated for accuracy to expected
results - and were found to meet these expectations. There is no reason to assume that
ns-2 or SSFNet would have yielded any diﬀerent results.
6.9 Summary
To conclude the series of tests prepared and executed on the developed simulation
framework and engine in Chapter 5, we can see that it successfully executed a wide
variety of simulated networking examples spanning normal networking (such as the
routing and protocol simulations) as well as malware-speciﬁc simulations (such as the
various worm scanning algorithms).
The results discussed in this chapter show that the simulator meets the goals set out
for it, namely it has been stress-tested using Internet worms, and has been found to
be capable of simulating large models while still achieving the expected outcomes for
each test.
The next chapter concludes this work, commenting on the results achieved in this
and the previous chapter, considering the achievements, shortcomings, and possible
extensions to this work.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
In this ﬁnal chapter, the conclusions regarding this work are drawn and analysed. In
Chapters 5 and 6, the simulations around which this work revolves were executed - in
Section 5.5 these results are discussed.
Section 7.4 covers the potential extensions to this research and the deliverable simu-
lator that it has created, while Section 7.5 suggests the applications that this work has
in academia and research, contrasting the beneﬁts against the stated shortcomings in
Section 7.6.
Finally, Section 7.7 draws the ﬁnal summary of this research together, concluding
this work.
7.2 Goal Review
The goals stated in Section 1.4 bear reﬂection upon completion of this research. The
two goals, as stated, were the development of a set of recommendations for construct-
ing robust Internet-scale simulators, and the development of a simulator using those
recommendations. They are reviewed and considered here.
7.2.1 Recommendations
Chapters 3 and 4 related a variety of experiences that a developer of a generic network
simulator should experience, as well as documenting how the challenges were overcome.
Chapter 3 states the software recommendations of developing the simulator, while
Chapter 4 discusses the speciﬁcs of how the simulator was constructed.
The set of recommendations proved to be suﬃcient for the construction of the simu-
lator, detailed in the next section. The recommendations covered both the theoretical
(design) and the practical (implementation) aspects of simulator design, on a broad
level as well as including many practical observations.
As such, the development of recommendations for the construction of these simula-
tors can be considered successful. They can be used by other researchers in this subject
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area as a basis for their own simulator development.
7.2.2 Simulator
The simulator that was to be developed as a goal for this research was completed
early in the research and then continually improved, as explained in Chapter 3. It has
evolved through iterative development cycles to allow for easier development and more
eﬃcient access to resources.
The evidence of the success of the simulator can be found in Chapters 5 and 6. The
results of Chapter 5 show that the simulator is capable of a broad variety of aspects
of networking and the results of Chapter 6 show that the simulations it performs are
capable of focused research into a particular domain.
Speciﬁcally, the simulator succeeded in its chief goal - it is both robust, capable of a
diverse range of simulation, and large in scale, capable of simulating millions of events
across the full IPv4 Internet. It has been shown to be scalable, via the distributed
memory prototype, but that component of the system must still be matured before
becoming a core part of the simulator.
The simulator has shown itself to be capable of Internet malware simulation, achiev-
ing every expected outcome presented in this document.
This goal, then, can also be considered successfully completed.
7.3 Reﬂections
Chapter 2 reviewed some of the literature available on network simulations, Internet
worms and network simulators. This research made use of these resources to yield the
speciﬁcations for creating a network simulator, detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.
It then proposed a series of simulations that would test the operations of a simula-
tor developed according to the speciﬁcations proposed. The results can be found in
Chapters 5 and 6.
While the simulator presented has adequately completed all of the requirements set
before it (as shown above in Section 7.2), it does not have the resources at the disposal
of the larger network simulators (such as ns-2 or SSFNet, detailed in Section 2.6). It
oﬀers features that neither of these simulators have reproduced: using a highly cross-
platform and language-agnostic approach, it allows for scalable network simulations -
but it does not have the large component/plugin sets that these simulators can boast.
It has been eﬀective in the rapid development of plugins and simulations, and has
been shown to be extensible via the grid prototyping, discussed in Section 4.4. It has
also been shown as eﬀective in running large simulations, representing millions of hosts
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(albeit via abstraction using network nodes) over the course of tens of millions of ticks.
These simulations have accurately depicted the expected results - the results of Internet
worms have been compared to the expected results and found to match closely.
Section 7.2 compares the expectations of the research to the achievements, and ﬁnds
that the research in this work can be considered a success.
7.4 Extensions
Due to the modular nature of the simulator, extensions in terms of simulations are
very simple to suggest: any form of network research can be investigated using the
simulator to test hypotheses. However, the challenge in further development of the
simulation engine itself is also imperative.
Simulations which logically extend the research in Internet worm simulation that
could be used might include:
• The development of cutting-edge countermeasures simulations added to the sys-
tem for testing and evaluation (such as increasing the focus on tarpits and RBLs
and network telescopes)
• Testing various novel worm concepts and existing concepts which were out of the
scope of this document (such as crypt-virii, ﬂashworms, and bot-nets)
• Using existing worm datasets to test and calibrate the accuracy of the simulator
against real-world data. Captures of real world worm traﬃc are available from
organisations such as CAIDA (see Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis (2008b)), however there are limitations in accessing these given the
scarcity of connectivity in South Africa, and the datasets are very large.
Extensions to the simulator that could result in further extensions to the work include
the following:
• The simulator has been designed to operate upon a grid (which is part of the
design concept), but was never properly implemented beyond the prototype dis-
cussed in Section 4.4 due to time and technical constraints. By adding additional
grid capability to the simulator (by ooading additional processing and optimis-
ing grid memory distribution), further grid development will increase the memory
capacity and processing power available to simulations.
• The initial concept for the simulator included a GUI design. This was later
discarded as a secondary priority, but would add a layer of user-friendliness and
usability that would make the system more useful to non-developers.
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• Constructing more diverse plugins for packaging with the simulator will make
simulations even easier to run for researchers. The existing plugins are suﬃcient
for worm research and basic IPv4 testing, but lower and higher level protocol
plugins would make other research simpler.
Finally, an additional avenue of research, which Section 6.8 shows was not considered
in this document, was to compare eﬃciency and scalability of this simulator with those
of other simulators.
These extensions are all within the scope of a capable developer or researcher, while
providing valuable additions to the network simulator described in this document.
7.5 Applications of This Work
This document and the simulator that it describes can provide a valuable set of guide-
lines to network and security professionals and researchers.
The document details the construction of a tool which security or research insti-
tutes could implement for themselves, with optimisations and additional details added
according to their needs. The importance of the robustness of their simulations has
been discussed, and it is hoped that researchers will take the advice into consideration:
robust simulators allows for simple extensions to be rapidly developed outside of the
bounds of simpler, domain-speciﬁc simulators which are commonly found in academia.
The simulator that is used in this work is also highly applicable to security re-
searchers, particularly in the area of worm research. Commonly used plugins have
already been developed, and due to the simulator's cross-platform nature it is very
easy for other researchers in the ﬁeld to run their simulations, with little thought on
underlying architecture required. It has many example simulations already available,
and it is open-source in order to allow others to learn from the existing work.
Finally, this document itself brings together much research in the ﬁelds of security
and simulation, and shows the importance of simulation as an important research tool
in this ﬁeld.
7.6 Shortcomings
This reseach, while valuable, has several shortcomings that must be acknowledged.
7.6.1 Eﬃciency
Firstly, while eﬃciency of simulation has been maintained, it came at the cost of
accuracy (due to the loss of granularity). This is an expensive trade-oﬀ, which could
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be reduced by more eﬃcient coding and data structures (particularly, in a more eﬃcient
memory management system). The grid prototype discussed in Section 4.4 is one way
in which eﬃciency has been addressed - further development of distributed processing
is an immediate step towards resolving this shortcoming.
7.6.2 Development
The simulator currently requires .NET or mono development for simulations, even
those using the simplest available plugins. As stated in Section 7.4, the initial concept
for the simulator included a GUI in order to allow non-developers to use the simulator
(despite being limited by the inability to create new plugins).
7.6.3 IPv4 Limitation
The simulator is currently set to only use IPv4 addresses for hosts. This removes
several simulation options (such as OSI layer 1 and 2 simulations). This limitation is
artiﬁcial, as any research into non-IPv4 networking can easily add such capability, but
the networking at present is not perfectly robust.
7.6.4 Time Scale
Because the simulator operates in abstract `ticks', which bear no resemblance to any
real time period, it is challenging to associate a speciﬁc time in a simulation with time
in the real world. When testing, this is artiﬁcally avoided by scaling time to match
known infection spread times, but when performing speculative simulations the results
may diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
7.7 Final Summary
In conclusion, it is necessary to restate the importance of simulation in security re-
search. As the broad body of research literature shows, simulation is an imperative part
of the testing and development process, especially in a ﬁeld like security where research
can involve sensitive information which should not be exposed to non-researchers, ele-
ments which are dangerous if directly reproduced, or controlled environments for testing
which are diﬃcult to create.
The development of simulators which can execute complex simulations which can
be easily extended is preferable to one-shot simulations, as research beneﬁts from
tools that can be altered to ﬁt the needs of the problems considered. Futhermore,
by constructing plugin architectures that encourage modularity, creation of complex
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network simulations is possible with little eﬀort if the required plugins exist or are
similar to existing plugins. Another aspect that is important to these simulators is
eﬃciency (to the extent that they can execute a variety of simulations on a researcher's
desktop PC).
The best way to test all of the above attributes of the system is via a load-heavy
series of simulations. An example of this is Internet worm simulation, as worms grow
quickly and aﬀect a diverse range of networking components, as well as being well
documented.
A simulator was developed for this research, and showed promising results. A se-
lection of tests in the form of simulations was executed upon the simulator, and the
results show that it does succeeds in simulating known worm behaviour, meeting the
expected outcomes for every simulation.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Connection A component of a computer network which models any form of commu-
nication between two nodes.
Hilbert Curve A fractal space-ﬁlling curve that allows one dimensional data to be
represented in multiple dimensions, while maintaining locality - eﬀective in rep-
resenting IP addresses in a square visual while the position of the data retains
signiﬁcant semantic value.
Host Any node to which information can be addressed.
Internet Worm Malicious software that can propagate without motivation - it requires
tangible interaction with the Internet in order to spread.
IP Internet Protocol, a means of networked communication which uses four octets for
addressing, the basis for the modern Internet.
Malware Malicious software, executable information which can execute code that the
would be detrimental to the system upon which it resides.
Node Any component of a computer network which can transfer information.
OSI The Open Systems Interconnect model of networking explains protocols using a
stack. Each layer of the stack is interchangable, with lower layers represent-
ing the communication and physical protocols while high layers represent the
application-speciﬁc protocols.
Packet In simulated networking, a component that may contain information. In real
networking, a conceptual unit of data transferral which can be part of a larger
stream of data, or an isolated single communique.
Simulations A single modeled scenario in which aspects of the real world are depicted,
typically with changes depicted over time. Useful for speculation, plan testing
and prototyping.
Simulator A piece of software that executes simulations, including storing the sim-
ulated components in memory, executing changes upon those components, and
presenting these changes to the user.
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TCP Transmission Control Protocol, a protocol that abstracts streams of informa-
tion by using IP as an underlying communication protocol while adding features
to ensure that data is communicated without loss of integrity.
UDP A connectionless alternative protocol to TCP, it sends packets without the ne-
cessity of an abstract connection. This results in lower transmission overhead,
but no guarantee of successful transmission.
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Appendix B: Example Results
An example of output from the simulator developed in Chapters 3 and 4 and used in
Chapters 5 and 6 is presented here.
This example output is from a simulation similar to the Blaster worm simulation
(found in Section 6.6.4), with higher latency and much higher modeled worm growth.
The format of the output is described here:
Regular Output
Every time tick in the system, the simulator outputs a line of text to indicate the
current state. The output has the following ﬁelds:
T: indicates the current tick of the simulation
EvCount: indicates the number of events currently scheduled to be executed. This
will increase exponentially in worm simulations, and is typically almost entirely com-
posed of send events.
TimeDif: is the diﬀerence in milliseconds between the completion of the last tick
and the one prior to its execution. This is useful in estimating the remaining time in
a simulation.
Network Logging Output
Periodically, the state of the network is written to ﬁle. This serves as a backup in case of
system failure during critical or lengthly simulations, as well as allowing post-execution
study of the system as it executes. During this time, more information about the
system is gathered and presented to the user. Due to the relatively high cost of writing
large amounts of data to ﬁle, this action is only performed occasionally throughout
a simulation, typically on the third, ﬁfth, tenth, thirtieth, ﬁftieth, hundredth, three-
hundredth (and so on) ticks.
The ﬁelds in this output are as follows:
Worm name infections: indicates the number of fully simulated hosts that the
worm has infected.
Worm name infections packetsink: indicates the number of abstracted hosts that
the worm has infected.
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Scheduler count: shows the number of events currently scheduled to be executed.
This will increase exponentially in worm simulations, and is typically almost entirely
composed of send events.
Message count: is the number of messages currently in circulation (i.e. on incoming
or outgoing queues) throughout the system.
Message from sink count: is the number of messages that have been sent by the
abstracted network.
Message from host count: is the number of messages that have been sent by fully
simulated hosts.
% messages from hosts: is the percentage of the total messages that have been sent
by hosts. This is a good measure when testing and debugging various aspects of the
abstracted network nodes.
Simulation Speciﬁcs
It should be noted that the setup event which creates all the nodes and the recurring
worm event is executed at tick 3, and that the ﬁnish action and the failsafe ﬁnish
action (both of which cease execution of the simulation, the failsafe used in the event
that the ﬁnish action fails in some fashion) are added with the setup action.
The long buildup before the event count increases is due to the simulated latency of
the Blaster worm.
T: 1 EvCount: 3 TimeDif: 0
T: 2 EvCount: 3 TimeDif: 3.774
T: 3 EvCount: 103 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 229.122
--> Logging network state < 3 > <--
---------------------------------------------------
Current information about the system:
Blaster_Red_Infections_PacketSink : 0
Blaster_Red_Infections : 1
Scheduler count: 103
Message count: 1
Message from sink count: 0
Message from host count: 1
% messages from hosts: 100
---------------------------------------------------
T: 4 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 12.342
T: 5 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.041
T: 6 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.323
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T: 7 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.044
T: 8 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.045
T: 9 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.052
T: 10 EvCount: 102 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.044
--> Logging network state < 10 > <--
---------------------------------------------------
Current information about the system:
Blaster_Red_Infections_PacketSink : 0
Blaster_Red_Infections : 1
Scheduler count: 101
Message count: 1
Message from sink count: 0
Message from host count: 1
% messages from hosts: 100
---------------------------------------------------
T: 11 EvCount: 100 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.476
T: 12 EvCount: 100 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.04
T: 13 EvCount: 100 InfCount: 0 TimeDif: 0.044
[...]
T: 906 EvCount: 1920639 InfCount: 343205 TimeDif: 49082516.863
T: 907 EvCount: 1992617 InfCount: 355395 TimeDif: 52358467.866
T: 908 EvCount: 2067530 InfCount: 368012 TimeDif: 56816139.746
T: 909 EvCount: 2145767 InfCount: 381037 TimeDif: 59607466.733
T: 910 EvCount: 2225760 InfCount: 394569 TimeDif: 66807330.115
[...]
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Appendix C: Simulator Software
and Plugins
The software used for this research may be found at http://snrg.ict.ru.ac.za/projects/graphsim-
a-robust-network-simulator/. It is developed using monodevelop1, and executes upon
the open-source project mono2.
A selection of developed plugins are shown below, with development testing and
debugging plugins (which are unstable) marked by italics:
Node plugins
DefaultNode A default node which does nothing
IPv4 An abstract node representing any IPv4-addressable node
IPv4Node An implementation of the IPv4 abstract node, this was used for the
majority of early simulations
InfectableHost A node representing any IPv4-addressable node capable of worm
infection
PacketSink An early conceptual network node which performed no operations
on any incoming packets
IPv4_Partial_Node A `leaf' node of a tree used for storing nodes in memory
for quick access
IPv4_Full_Node A `parent' node of a tree used for storing nodes in memory
for quick access
SimpleNode A simple IPv4 node used in later simulations
Node The generic name for standard nodes used in later simulations, it could
perform simple routing and was infectable by Internet worms
NetworkNode The generic name for standard network nodes used in later sim-
ulations, it accepted and logged incoming worm packets
Connection plugins
1http://monodevelop.com
2http://www.mono-project.com
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DefaultConn A default connection which does nothing
ImmedConn A simple connection object used in early debugging that sent pack-
ets without any form of queue or delay in transfer
DelayConn A connection object that implemented a random delay via packet
queues
IPv4Conn A connection betweeen two IPv4-addressable nodes, otherwise similar
to an ImmedConn
Conn The generic name for standard network connection used in later simula-
tions, it immediately sent packets, using no queueing mechanism by using
the queues in the sending/receiving nodes, because latency was implemented
by action modules
Packet plugins
DefaultPacket A default packet which does nothing
IPv4Packet A standard packet with IPv4 from and to address ﬁelds
Packet The generic name for network packets, these also used IPv4 from and
to ﬁelds, and were very similar to IPv4Packets
Action plugins
DefaultAction A default action which does nothing
BasicSend This plugin was developed in the early stages of simulation devel-
opment to test the communication framework. It sends a packet using a
DelayConn
BasicReceive This plugin was developed in the early stages of simulation de-
velopment to test the communication framework. It receives a packet that
had previously been sent via BasicSend that is enqueued on a DelayConn
NRSend/RNSend/NNSend/NISend These plugins were used for early routing
prototyping. The preﬁxed letter couple uses N to represent nodes, R for
router, and I for Internet (or network node). The ﬁrst letter indicates the
sender of the packet, the second letter the receiver of the packet.
LogEvent This plugin was used throughout the debugging phase to write de-
tailed system states to ﬁle, enabling in-depth study of the operations of the
simulator.
Setup A catch-all plugin which is overridden for each simulation, it creates the
structure of the network using other plugins and queues the ﬁrst round of
actions that are to be executed
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Finish A catch-all plugin which is overridden for each simulation, it stops the
execution engine and, if necessary, write the ﬁnal state of the network to an
output - either ﬁle, or to the console
Worm A plugin that represents a worm. Every time this action executes, it
iterates through every infected node, enqueueing worm packets that are
generated according to the worm scanning algorithm speciﬁed, and then
adds a new instance of itself to the scheduler in the nearby future
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